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MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, JURIST IN LIMINE:
DISSENT AND THE JUDGING FACULTY*

A. J. Levint

I
JUSTICES JOHNSON AND HOLMES AND SOME DYNAMIC
ASPECTS OF DISSENT

A. The Role of Dissent in Democratic Societies
HERE is little more in the legal literature on the subject of dissent
than, on the one hand, the feeling that somehow it helps to present
more than one side of a question and, on the other, that dissent is confusing and unsettling, and, therefore to be avoided. The part that dissent
has played in preventing "history" from becoming the routine repetition
of events, the function it fulfills in saving mankind from a mechanical
adherence to an authoritarian concept of society, the psychodynamic need
of the individual for self-expression-particularly evident in democratic
societies-these and other related approaches have had not only inadequate treatment but hardly any consideration at all on the part of those
who write about laws and law-making.

T

r. Motivations underlying Dissent-Aggression of Reason
Even those who have been notable dissenters have been quite obscure
as to the motivations underlying their need to differ. Thus, Justice
Brandeis, in one of his outstanding dissenting opinions, concluded with
considerable animus, "If we would be guided by the light of reason, we
must let our minds be bold." 1 But others in society, after all, also believe
that they are being guided by the light of reason and feel they must
support their reason with appropriate courageous action. Another part
of the psychodynamic picture would require the addition of the thought
that we must let our minds be bold lest the aggressions of others under
the cloak of reason be established as a mode of conduct for us and a law

*
t

This concludes Mr. Levin's studies on Mr. Justice Johnson. Two companion
articles appeared in 46 MICH. L. REv. 131,481 (1947-1948).-Ed.
Member of the State of Michigan Bar; A.B., J.D., University of Michigan;
author of articles in this and other legal periodicals.-Ed.
1
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 at 3II, 52 S.Ct. 371 (1931). See
also reference to a similar remark in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 44
S.Ct. 412 (1924) and MAsoN, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 580 (1946). But
a modern psychologist warns us that people though they think and talk rationally live
irrationally. RANK, BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY II (1941).
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for society. Those who would let their minds be bold arid who would
become aggressive toward the reason of others must be informed; otherwise the struggle is between the blind and the blind. It is one thing to
know with scientific awareness that boldness is required in a situation but
quite another to be able to recognize the unreasoned aggressions beneath
either militant righteousness or rigorous mechanisms of self-control.
It is in the disparity between the latter and the former that we discover
some of the principal evidenFes of the aberrations of so-called "normal"
civilization.
2.

A Revolution in the Outlets for Aggression

Jared Sparks, clergyman, editor and publisher, reviewed Johnson's
Life of Greene in the North American Review of October, r822. He
wrote that he was sorry to discover "a degree of implacability" in the
work. "We sometimes meet with a word," he complained, "which has
not yet found its way into our vocabularies, such as 'dampening,'
'retroact,' ... 'aggressive' ....nz What strikes us in this criticism is not
only that we have here another illustration of Johnson's dissent but
also an apt illustration of what gives rise to dissent.
Here again we call attention to the fact that the American Revolution
was a revolution of the mind. It was the most formidable event in history
in the direction of choice as a substitute for compulsion. Choice means
dissent. Sparks was one of that vast preponderance of thinkers who
feared this trend although himself a creative scholar. His reaction is an
index of wider implications. Contemporary thought bore the deep traces
of earlier attitudes which legalized war, chivalry, duelling, the ordeal
and trial by combat. These and other manifestations of aggression were
surrounded with the aura of romance, adventure, honor, prestige, and
divine favor. Thomas Carlyle adored his "berserker" Norse kings who
hacked away at those whom they elected to be their enemies. The mixture
of combativeness and love has been the favorite theme of poets. The
brave who distinguished themselves in arms were not stigmatized as
being "aggressive." The stigma of "aggressive" was reserved for those
who dissented from'the domination of authoritarian thinking wherever
2
15 N. AM. REV. 423 at 429 (1822); and see 46 MICH. L. REV. 131 at 137
, (1947). The connection between language and human cultural development is a close
one and the psychodynamic aspects of the part language has played has hardly been touched -

upon, as Rank's comment in the preceding note indicates. However, it is safe to say that
a predilection for new words goes with a dissenting or creative mind. Thus, Bentham
coined the words "international" and "minimize." BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, Ogden ed., xxvii (1931).
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such boldness showed itself-whether in religion, law or the physical
sciences. Those who sought to advance the knowledge of man about
himself were promptly disposed of by ostracism, excommunication, torture, imprisonment or death. The auto-da-fe, for example, was legalized
aggression against dissenters.
But the beginnings of some change were visible. It was a contemporary
of Johnson who first articulated it into exquisite poetry. The coming of
Shelley upon the scene marked the beginning of the time when poets
would write verse about the feats of men who advanced human understanding and struggled for the progress of the human mind. Ozymandias
was published in r8r8 and Prometheus Unbound in 1820. The former
deprecated the aimless and futile aggressions for personal power; the
latter glorified the latent power of the human mind left free and unfettered to defy power "which seems omnipotent." It may be called
the poem of modern science-the keynote of which is dissent founded
upon the conclusions drawn from trial and error and the insight which
comes from discovering psychodynamic factors now just beginning to be
understood.
It is when we realize that this change, so apparent in retrospect, has
passed the conscious notice of hi9torians and even of psychologists that
we can better see our civilization in psychodynamic perspective. Spinoza,
Copernicus, Galileo and Bruno were considered the dangerous ones
rather than those who engaged in out-and-out war and combat. Dissent
was the unforgivable crime until the American and French Revolutions.
Th~e historic events by no means made it easy for the dissenter. But
the political atmosphere of democracy and individual freedom had
perforce to include the right to disagree. Freedom of the press and
freedom of religion mean freedom of the mind and the right to disagree
with claims of omnipotent power.
Thus we see two main channels of aggression in the course of history.
The one is the aggression of combat and destruction; the other is the
aggression of creative and constructive dissent. These are not hard and
fast classifications, for they are interchangeable or may become allied
as in scientific warfare. But they will serve as illustrations of psychodynamic trends. Nor do we assert that what is termed conveniently as
"aggression" is a fundamentalist concept. The word includes much that
is not even understood. Furthermore, there are other outlets of human
energy and other means for the release of emotion and tension which
would have to be considered. But the preeminence of aggression as a
factor is unquestioned.
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3. Origin of the Right to Protest-the Jester
The guaranty of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, though
qualified by circumstances in some instances, greatly accelerated the use
of dissent as a means of sublimation of otherwise more direct combat.
And with this deflection from physically directed aggression came social
benefits as a result of the focusing of so much energy toward creative
scientific endeavor of all sorts. No wonder that freedom of speech and
of the press became "inalienable" rights, for, unconsciously at least, the
framers of the Constitution realized that the discharge of psychodynamic
energy in the progress of a democracy would be largely through the
ways of peace, even though this did not carry with it the idea of peace of
mind.
,
This seems to be borne out by the previous unpretentious history of
the right to protest. For, in earlier days the right to protest, as a right,
with one exception, simply did not exist. That exception is the case of
the uncensored jests of the court jester or clown usually appointed by
the king or some other high officer. The "fool" alone could say with
impunity what was in his mind, although at times he was subjected to
physical punishments and arbitrary silencing. "Fools," we are told by
Dr. Doran, "were free to speak before there was a liberty of the press,
or even a press at all." 3 But the liberty of these fools was not unlimited
for we know that, although they were really wise men, they were compelled to transmute their criticisms or advice into the more palatable
form of quips and jests. But it was a Lord Chancellor who took the next
step and imported a jester who was "employed not with license to
speak bold and droll truths to their master, but with the commission
... of deceiving a nation." 4 Shakespeare's plays have recorded this step
in the development of human liberty in the portrayal of the clowns of
his great dramas. Nor is this method obsolete. In our day many will
remember the genial Will Rogers, the unofficial and self-appointed critic
of the government, who, with wit, humor and insight, took to task Congressmen, Senators, Cabinet Officers and even the President.
The poets and pamphleteers followed the jester in the course of the
struggle for free expression. These were voluntary dissenters and not
officially appointed for the purpose of challenging the king's judgment
or supplying it. The judicial dissenter, with the rarest of exceptions,
simply did not exist. There was really only one of the stature of Sir
3

DoRAN,

THE

HISTORY OF CouRT FooLs

51 (1858).

ld. 107-108 and 232-233. The official fool was preceded by the house fool who
survived the court fool.
4
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Edward Coke who dared to question the authority of the king. By and
large, the judicial officer was the agent of administration and was required
to do justice within accepted notions of legal propriety.
Jurisprudence has become a compartmentalized science. The student
of the law does not consider that there might be a connection between
the institution of the court jester and the emergence of a Justice Johnson
who becomes an open, avowed and officially invested dissenter. But any
attempt at a·psychodynamic evaluation must unfold the layers of culturally induced opacities which have, because of false notions of "dignity"
or "sanctity," obscured dynamic relationships of the utmost importance
and have shut the doors of better knowledge. Let us then consider some
aspects of this relationship as it affects the origins and development of
jurisprudence.

4. The Jester and the Judicial Dissenter
a. Communication and self-control
The jest is itself a part of an effort at communication. We must find
for it some place in man's efforts to communicate with others of his
specie. We can observe at least six steps in the psychological processes
directed toward that end. First, man learned, as Sir Henry Maine pointed
out, to postpone his intentions- " ... it was a step forward when men
learned to pause before attacking instead of attacking at onc~." 5 :Various
means were employed to delay aggressive action such as seizure of
property-<listress-and long and extended indulgence in technicalities
of the forms of pleading and other refined procedures. But it must not
be assumed that psychodynamic Fabian policy is not also aggressive.
Nevertheless, this furnished a much needed cooling off period. These
procedures were in part, at least, psychodynamic avoidance mechanisms
-of which there are others functioning for different purposes. Second,
there are the personalized and internalized mechanisms of restraint
whose manifestations have been recently considerably clarified but the
5
MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 302 (1875). The passage from which
the quoted portion is taken is an excellent example of Maine's scientific integrity and
detachment in search for legal origins. His complete objectivity in observing data, which
reveals the speciousness of the superficial investment of judicial and legal institutions
with awesome and mystic dignity, is a sound standard to be followed in any search for
the psychodynamic factors of jurisprudence.
The idea of delayed attack and postponed instinctual satisfaction leads directly to
the very primordial evidences of what gives rise to legal society. In other words, law seems
to be entirely predicated upon the basis of frustration. This is because law prohibits.
Conducted experiments on the effect of delay when excitations are aroused resulted in
sleepiness in both men and animals. 8 PsYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 359 (1946).

482
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precise origin of which is just becoming the subject of general investigation. Some of these are the dream as a device somehow connected with
the postponement of unrealized intention, the mechanism we call ccconscience" which enables us to be law-abiding without a policeman watching
over us, the psychotic delusions and so-called ccnormal" illusions which
serve as substitutes for reality, the growing list of psychosomatic symptoms such as the paralyzed arm, the hysterical conversions, tics and many
ailments which either are the direct result of conflict or are at least related
to it, the shedding of tears as a substitute for attack as was the case with
the Sioux Indians who, according to Parkman, sobbed when they greeted
a stranger. And the list is far from complete. Third, there are substitutes
for physical aggression and release of energy which are not internalized
but are turned outward, such as the case of the aggressive and ccchronic"
litigant or the jester who opposes by means of thought and words. And
fourth, there are those affective or emotional transfers of feeling which
achieve legal behavior with a minimum of compulsion-all of those
socially cherished attitudes and relationships which are suggested by
such words as ccempathy," ccrapport," ccloyalty" or cclove.'? Fifth, there
are all those efforts to convert human energy into intellectual or other
cultural embodiments in which the person's personal relationship to
society finds some solution in the activities which have been labelled
ccsublimations." In this class belongs the doctor, the lawyer, the scientist
and the preacher. The value to society as the result of such activities is
often accidental and does not always bear a direct relationship to the
conscious purpose of the individual, because often an aggressive drive is
behind the exaggerated pretense of social welfare. We can place law in
a sixth classification which touches all of the rest most intimately. But
we can say that here belongs the idea that man's ability to communicate
with man and with nature somehow depends not only upon his ability to
employ his intellect to observe similarities-cclaws"-but also to employ
his total personality to "see" relationships and to feel into them. To see
the similarities has hitherto been the main objective of legal training; to
see relationships has been almost wholly neglected. But these are neither
all-inclusive nor hard and fast categories. However, once we have
understood the part these play in the psychodynamics of legal behavior
we will have covered the largest portion of the ground. At this stage we
consider only the third groupings, the jest which is turned outward.
There is an old saying that a jest breaks no bones. In other words,
the jest is a psychodynamic compromise which substitutes a thought for
physical aggression. Everyone has met the aggressive jester who attacks
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with words instead of with his fists-and everyone has at some time or
other employed the jest for this very reason. The jest serves as a substitute
for a disturbance of the peace and it is possible to think that its moderate
use even against one's self is condoned because we all recognize its
utility, just as we accept and glorify actual physical aggression short of
foul play in a football game.
Though we do not approve of the trickster, he is psychologically not
far removed from the jester because he too substitutes thought for
physical aggression. Anthropologists have from time to time attempted
explanations of the prevalence in primitive life of the trickster-deity or
the hero-creator who appears in myths and folklore as a comic character,
a player of pranks, a burlesque hero or bu:ffoon. The explanations of
these tales are often belabored. An analysis of them from the psychodynamic viewpoint resolves many of these secondary elaborations of
mythologists into more primary ones. Moreover, the facts found are
of great value. For example, it has been noticed that the comic deity or
hero often perforn:ied his antics at a solemn occasion when a sacred rite
was being carried out.6
6

See Lowrn, PRIMITIVE RELIGION, pp. 312-313 and 121, 132, 271 (1924). Also
Lowrn, PRIMITIVE SocIETY 373 (1920), where the author calls attention to the court
jester, who may insult even the king.
The comic has been employed in ways that seem strange unless its psychodynamic
function is revealed. Thus in the Island of Bali it is a part of the death ceremonies.
Miguel Covarrubias tells of these people for whom cremation is an occasion for gaiety since
it represents the accomplishment of their most sacred duty: the burning of the dead to
liberate their souls so they can attain the higher worlds and be free for reincarnation into
better beings. JsLAND OF BALI 359 (1938). The above reasons for this practice are
psychologically an admission that the comedy is part of a dissenting procedure. The
emphasis on liberation of the soul gives the unmistakable character of protest to the idea of
reincarnation. Only then will the unpleasant repression of actual living be replaced by a
better state 6f affairs.
Joel Chandler Harris, in his introduction to UNCLE REMUS, His SONGS AND His
SAYINGS xiv ( I 920), says that the story of the Rabbit and the Fox is characteristic of the
Negro and, with the usual synthesis which goes with unusual insight, points to the
psychodynamic facts which should be noticed.
Among the Hausa of West Africa the spider is the king of cunning and folk-lore.
He is favorably identified with deceit and trickery which is seldom punished if it is
sufficiently clever. TREMEARNE, HAUSA SUPERSTITIONS AND CusTOMS 48 and elsewhere,
index under spider (1913).
See also FROBENIUs, THE CHILDHOOD OF MAN (1909). Laws were identified with
the spider by Solon who compared them to cobwebs which let the light things fall
through but the meshes of which were broken by the weightier things which thus escape.
Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 at 177, 47 S.Ct.
2 l ( I 926), said of certain arguments that they seemed to him "spider's webs inadequate
to control the dominant facts." The significance of such symbolism_ as applied to law is
to indicate a strong dislike for the legal restraints which seem only partially effective in
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It would appear that these primitive characters of fact and fiction
partake of the same dynamism as the clown or court jester. We see here
a twofold process. First, there is the compromise of aggression on the
part of the comic performer; and, second-but no less important-the
exhibition is a legalized symbol of protest or dissent against the authority
of the group. It is frequently a large scale expression of instinct translatable into such modern language terms as "liberty," "freedom" and
"independence," underneath which lurks the idea of lack of inhibition.
The ambivalent combination of levity and solemnity may be psychologically compared to the checks and balances of constitutional government which preserve freedom through the imposition of restraints.

b. Common sublimations of combativeness
I

The formulation of such legal and quasi-legal concepts as deceit,
fraud, false pretenses or the less legalized means such as lying, hypocrisy,
face-saving, diplomacy or any type of pretense or rationalization is the
result of persistent protest against personal restraint which puts a curb on
open combativeness. These types of protest, which society seemingly
dis~vows, it nevertheless preserves in war, statecraft, etiquette and games
of sport where trickery, strategy and deception survive. We deal here
with differences of degree only. No one would wish to outlaw trickery
in the game of football where deception is part of the "law" of the
game. But we surely should try to understand why we act with such
obvious inconsistency.
In the case of mental illnesses, where the regression to primitive
behavior is marked, we find a reappearance of these earlier efforts at
solutions. The child who has found little love and acceptance in his
early environment begins at a premature age to match his combativeness
with his family and society and the solution often causes him to resort
to strategem to attain his ends. Though compelled to conform, the child
solving man's desires either as an individual or a member of society. He was concerned with
what he once described as little decisions "which have in them the germ of some wider
theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."
These interstices were noticed by Justice Johnson. Referring to the equity power and
the means of exercising it he remarked that " . . . after the common law courts have
ingrafted into their practice as much as can be there assumed, the Legislature is compelled
to exercise the rest; or else leave a large space for the appropriate field of judicial action
unoccupied." Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 469 at 548 (1833).
Of the American Indian, who was rather advanced in the scale of primitive life,
Francis Parkman wrote in l THE CONSPIRACY OF PoNTIAC 228-229 (1910) that
barbarism is to civilization what childhood is to maturity; and all savages, whether cowardly
or brave, whatever may be their country, their color, or their lineage, are prone to
treachery and deceit.
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often retains for a lifetime his own primitive means of dealing with such
situations. Some of the so-called "witches" of New England, who would
be considered as "hysterical" types today, were reported by observers as
having engaged in witty conversations for days and others were quieted
by reading jests.7 In other words, these were compromise aggressions
taking the form of intellectual dissent and harking back to an earlier
period. Their emotional meaning was retroactive-with a present implementation of childhood means.
It would not likely occur to more than the few, who may be looking
for psychodynamic similarities in all institutional experience, that there
is a relationship between the phenomenon of the jester or the omnipotent
hero or deity and the judicial dissenter. The limited interest is itself
evidence of the extent to which culture tends to shut out such knowledge.
But it is a great step forward when an official of the government not
only exercises the right to dissent but insists that in questions involving
the relationship between the individual and his government-as in constitutional questions-it is important that seriatim opinions be delivered
in order that the future be saved from a miscarriage due to unanimous
authority.
c. The emergence of judicial dissent
Justice Johnson was the fir&t jurist of our time to realize the function
of dissent in a democracy and to put his views into practice. He thereby
overcame the fear which in previous times classed dissent of any sort as
so dangerous as to be permitted only to the jester. True, there had been
other dissenters before him in the field of religion, of politics and of
science but these did not act under the official protection of the government. The legislator may be a possible exception but he has usually
7
Cotton Mather in his "Memorable Providences" reported of Goody Glover that
"her Tortures in a small while would pass over, and Frolicks succeed, in which she
would continue many hours, nay whole days, talking perhaps never wickedly, but alwaies
wittily, beyond herself.••• But she frequently told us, that if she might but steal, or be
drunk, she should be well immediately." BURR, NARRATIVES OF THE WITCHCRAFT
CASES, 1648-1706, p. III (1914). The significance of the psychodynamic fact that
solemnity and jest are combined among primitives appears in the regression to primitive
mentality in cases such as these. Cotton Mather goes on to tell us that he tried to get
the unfortunate girl to read while in her "Frolicks,"-"l brought her again one that
I thought was a Good Book; and presently she was handled with intolerable Torments.
But when I showed her a Jest-Book, as Tke Oxford Jests or Tke Cambridge Jests, she
could read them without any Disturbance, and have witty Descants upon them Too."
(Id., p. II 2). Jest was tolerable because it permitted the release of affect against the
restraint the Good Book offered. Undue restraint is conducive to the desire to retaliate for
the suffering caused against "culture" as an inhibiting cause.
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dissented on specific issues for political objectives and less to unshackle
"the expansive powers of the human mind."
Form, fiction and precedent were systematically examined by Johnson's analytic mind. These self-perpetuating tools of the common law
were looked into afresh to test their capacity to solve the new and complex
problems of the new democracy. He discovered in the slavish adherence
to the old mechanisms the influence of paralyzing fear, the distorting
work of the "monsters of the imagination." He ventured boldly in an
angry atmosphere which itself most conclusively proved his thesis. For
this perseverance he was considered "peculiar" by those who were exercising the "peculiar" traits of mind which he was attacking. It was the
task of the jurist, as he conceived it, to understand rather than to believe.
Civilized life he saw as a continuity of primitive society which had in its
turn gone through the trials and errors of an earlier period. The menhirs
and tumuli and legal dolmens of archaic times are, indeed but the superstitious ties with obsolete situations. 8
8
It was not long before the theory of evolution gave support to such a critical
attitude. Edward Clodd cited examples not only from barbaric but also from civilized
peoples "as witnessing to that continuity of ide:is which is obscured by familiarity and
ignored by prejudice.'' MYTHS AND DREAMS, Preface (1885). In myths are found the
germs of philosophy, theology and science. (Id. 7). The myth is no doubt a copious
source of law. Its hold on the mind is often stronger than mandate of law and in innumerable instances shapes the course which law takes. To speak, therefore, of the sources of law
without an understanding of the psychodynamics of myth formation and the emergence
of superstitions is to approach the study of the law after much of its history has already
taken place. Legends and traditions are potent forces in the making of law; hence, the
making of legend and tradition must also be understood, else the law will be understood
only as it comes through the screens which conceal dynamic processes. Recently, Mr.
Justice Robert H. Jacjcson has pointed to the fact that a vast proportion oU'law'' that is
applied today in the courts "had its origin long before the government. Some of it is as
old as the Scriptures, much of it is traceable in ancient codes, very little is really added
by ourselves." "The Trials of War Criminals," 32 A.B.A.J. 319 at 320 (1946).
We call attention to the fact that we do not subscribe to the idea of the "evolution"
of ideas as expressed by Clodd and others following the Darwinian influence. The organic
and biological metaphor are always tempting and, perhaps, often unavoidable. But
ideas do not grow or evolve like plants.
Sir Henry Maine was one of the first to call attention to the non-legalistic sources
of law. In answering the Austinian theory of sovereign command he insisted that the
entire mass of historical antecedents determines how the sovereign shall act. "All that
constitutes this-the whole enormous aggregate of opinions, sentiments, beliefs, superstitions and prejudices, of ideas of all kinds, hereditary and acquired, some produced
by institutions and some by the constitution of human nature-is rejected" by the
Austinians. MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS, Am. ed., 360 (1875).
Since writing the above article on Johnson the writer has published an article on
Maine's contribution toward a study of the?mental origin of institutions with particular
reference to patriarchal origins which have played so important a part in the genesis
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4. The Struggle against Mental Inertia
Johnson understood the meaning of the American Revolution because
he saw in it one of those convulsive efforts of mankind to overcome
mental inertia.9 He was not afraid to undertake a change although it
endanger security and cause uncertainty. While he was not entirely free
from reactions of fears he surely acted with less reliance upon customary
ways of thinking than most people. He agreed with Jefferson "that laws
and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind.mo Hence, his boldness was creative and not, as is so often the
case, destructive. He directed much of his energies against the magical
pressures of the past for socially desirable purposes but ultimately for
individual betterment.
The genesis of dissent and its intensity are related but must, nevertheless, be separately identified. Dissent may express itself in the Declaration of Independence, a revolutionary invention, the announcement
of the discovery of a new principle in physics or chemistry or in the
commission of crime. The difference is most often one of degree. The
psychodynamic import to the individual of rebellion of any kind is one
thing; the reaction of the members of society to it is still another-but
even here there is relationship by identification and other methods.
While opposition is a dominant factor in the genesis of dissent we may
not overlook the part which curiosity plays in its motivation. In science,
especially, the search for the new is a positive thing even though each
new discovery may annihilate an old belief. But we can be sure from
the manner in which scientists become protagonists and from the intolerance they often exhibit, that curiosity and aggression are, in research,
closely allied. The zealous humanitarian is a dissenter against some of
the most firmly held ideas which society has cherished and often is more
militant than the ones whom he seeks to bring around to his point of
view. Communist Russia, for example, conceives itself devoted to a
humanitarian purpose. But its dissent is psychodynamically uninformed.
It assumes that the specific knowledge which it preaches concerning
economics is the solution to all of the world's ills. But the dialectic of
of modern psychiatry. Levin, Maine, McLennan and Freud, I I PsYCHIATRY 177 (1948).
This was followed by a study of the factor of child rejection in history, psychiatry and
mythology as bearing upon the continuation of the patriarchal-matriarchal pattern of
legal society. Levin, The Oedipus Myth in History and Psychiatry, II PsYCHIATRY 283
(1948).
9
2 JOHNSON, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF NATHANAEL
GREENE 453 (1822).
10
Letter dated July 12, 1816 to Kercheval. IO FoRD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 42 (1892).
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economics is no different psychodynamically than any other dialectic.
Hence, Russia is today an outstanding example of screened aggression.
The dogma of Marxism, despite the general view that the Russians are
realistic, renders them the most unrealistic of peoples. A dissenting
philosophy which will not admit of any dissent is an unreal philosophy.
Mr. Justice Holmes with some seeming inconsistency had little use for
"the psychology of the average." The criticism of the "cultural lag" has
been quite common in more recent years. But it was more unusual for a
jurist in Johnson's day to refuse to be dominated by the thought mechanisms of the day. "Individuals are impelled to enterprise," he wrote,
"and the human mind acquires vigour, independence and acuteness,
from the reflections and discussions which are forced upon it. Awakened
from that state of torpor and of habit, in which nine-tenths of mankind
doze away their lives, and in which it is too much the interest of the
rulers of the earth to keep them absorbed, men discover that, however
bitter and harnessed, and :flayed and goaded, still the physical strength
is with them, whether the car of state is to be kept in motion, or overturned; and rulers become (somewhat too late) sensible that they have
duties to fulfill toward the governed." 11 We all know that new books,
new political ideas, new inventions, new operas, new symphocies, new
, fashions and many other novel creations have been rejected at first.
Some years ago Sir Henry Maine attributed fictions to the infancy of
society-which is recognized today as a primitive stage. "They satisfy,"
he wrote, "the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at
the same time that they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for
change which is always present.m2 As an historian, Johnson was keen
to observe "the tranquillity of conscious security" 13 which could lead
the individual astray; the same mental trait he found to explain some
of the resistance encountered in the group mind when required to take
necessary steps to make the Revolution a successful venture. "A whole'
'Community," he remarked, "is not easily impelled to an important
change of habits or opinions.m4 He found men to be "but slow calculators,
and easily seduced to the enjoyment of pleasures, and the gratification
of vanity."1 5 Here we have unmistakable evidence that Johnson's dissent
11

2 JOHNSON, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF NATHANAEL

GREENE 224.
12

18

Id. 307.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW

,
(1894).

14 2 JOHNSON, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF NATHANAEL

56.
Id. 152. See also Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43
MICH. L. REv. 497 at 533 (1944).
GREENE
15
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was not sporadic or actuated by political opportunism. Nor could it be
considered in any sense a pose. It is clear that it was the result of understanding of some of the most compelling motivating forces which either
roused the human mind to activity or caused it to "doze" away in torpor
and habit. Much has been learned since his day. But few have ever
devoted more sincere and consistent effort to implement mental progress
with official duty.
5. The Part of Reason in Governing Human Action
a. Holmes and the level of dominant ideas
Holmes once spoke of law as "a great anthropological document"
and stressed the study of it "as an exercise in the morphology and transformation of human ideas." "It is proper," he declared, "to resort to it
to discover what ideals of society have been strong enough to reach that
final form of expression, or what have been the changes in dominant
ideals from century to century." He found that "it is still only the minority who recognize how the change of emphasis which I have called the
law of fashion has prevailed even in the realm of morals.m6 He might
have added for completeness that the study of the dominant ideas should
necessarily include the study of the non-dominant ones. Much research
must still be undertaken to learn how all ideas arise and function in legal
societies. This is perhaps implied in the additional statement that "law
is human-it is a part of man, and of one world with all the rest.ni1
Elaborating on this thought of Holmes, we envisage history as a
vast record of conscious and unconscious data of psychological strivings
toward better communication between men. "Communication" is here
used in its broadest mental implications to include every type of human
endeavor. To restrict such investigation to logical mental processes as
presently understood leads to dead end. Justice Holmes wrote to Mr.
Wu-in private-"! hate to discourage the belief of a young man in
reason. I believe in it with all my heart, but ~ think its control over the
actions of men when it comes against what they want is not very great.ms
Beneath the eschars of reasoned culture are indeed the sensitive energies
which may upon slight provocation discard all that does not satisfy the
emotional and instinctive demands of the moment-even though they
may be clothed in the garb of rationality or ideology. The more one
16

Hou.ms, CoLLECTED PAPERS 212 and 213' (1920).
Brown University Commencement Address, 1897, id. at 165.
18
Letter dated December 12, 1921, SHRIVER, JusTicE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES,
His BooK NoTicEs AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 153 (19$6). {Italics
supplied.) Compare comment of Rank, note 1, supra.
17
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observes rational conduct the more clearly does it appear that Holmes
was correct. Not only has reason failed to make of the world a place
where reason prevails but there is demonstrated at every step of man's
history the fact that man has been unwilling to pierce the veil which
would reveal the underlying motivations of conduct. In the main,
civilized man has not improved much upon the procedures of primitive
man. The ability to reason is man's most important attribute but the use
he makes of it-even allowing for the advances made by science-is
deranged and catastrophic. Our employment of mental processes is still
at the level of the infant 19 and the savage. We must turn again to the
anthropologist for facts.

b. Anthropological data
Savages like children, have no steadiness of purpose, observed Sir John
Lubbock (Lord Avebury).20 He noticed another trait more commonly
recorded by many field observers. He found that the mind of savages was
not capable of very much strain; or, as he put it, the mind of the savage
"is easily fatigued." 21 The American Indian, acco_rding to Francis Parkman, was devoid of reflection and seldom took cognizance of abstract
ideas. 22 Elsewhere he spoke of that "savage 'lethargy of mind" from
19

See MARE'IT, FA1TH, HoPE, AND CHARITY IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION 124 (1932).
SIR JoHN LUBBOCK (LoRD AvEBURY),PRE-HISTORIC TIMES, Am. ed., 583
(1875).
21
SIR JOHN LUBBOCK (LoRD AVEBURY), THE ORIGIN OF CIVILISATION AND PRIMITIVE CoNDITION OF MAN 9 ( I 87 5). What the author calls fatigue requir,es further elaboration in the light of the modern data on the subject of emotional conflict. However, the
fact-finding is unimpeachable. The savage becomes " 'forgetful when voluntarily communicating information. On his attention being fully aroused, he often shows much quickness
in reply and ingenuity in argument. But a short conversation wearies him, particularly if
questions are asked that require effor~. of thought or memory on his part. The mind of
the savage then appears to rock to and fro out of mere weakness, and he tells lies and
talks nonsense.'" Id. 9-10 quoting from Sproat's account of the Ahts of N.W. America.
As to how this trait of the mind has operated in the field of the law in former times,
see Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, and the Common Incidents of Life," 44 MICH.
L. REv. 59 at 74-75 (1945). ·
McLennan, who locked horns with Maine in a bitter controversy about the patriarchal theory of civilization nevertheless agreed with the idea that forms of expression
are to be reckoned with. He points out how in the case of Roman law the history is
incomplete "as written on the face of it." Legal processes went through forms of howls
and gesticulations and other forms "pregnant with meaning and instruction." What
Michelet called "the poetry of law • • • the symbolic forms that appear in a code or in
popular customs, tell us as certainly of the early usages of a people, as the rings in the
transverse section of a tree tell of its age." STUDIES IN ANCIENT HISTORY, Am. ed., 7, 8
(1886).
22
PARKMAN, CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC 43 (1897).
20
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which it is so hard to rouse the Indian. 23 We are familiar with the taciturnity of the Indian. However, when we recall the oratorical ability of
the Indian chieftains and their capacity to express their wishes in forceful
metaphor, we must conclude that these appraisals of anthropologists and
historians must in some respects be qualified.We would say that evidences
of mental fatigue often represent only fixations of interest which are
to a large extent environmental rather than indicative of lack of mental
capacity. After allowing for degrees of capacity among primitives at
different levels of civilization we still find that potentialities have seldom
been tested in a psychodynamically favorable atmosphere. Statements
of travelers seem extreme as, for example, that the South Africans could
not raise thought above things of sense.2 Yet the observation no doubt
records the dominant trait which is feeling rather than thinking.
These accounts must be read together with Johnson's conclusion
which we have set forth a few paragraphs earlier, that men are "slow
calculators" and that most men are content to "doze away" their lives.
Since he felt as he did it would follow that his dissent was not only an
attempt to exclude himself from this generalization but a conscious
effort to accomplish some change. Some decades later Sir John Lubbock
(Lord Avebury) still felt that mankind was in reality but on the threshold of civilization.25
4,

6. Primitive Methods of Discharging Affect
~- Resignation of judiciary to fear mechanisms
We are not dealing with conditions which have already transpired.
On the contrary, once we realize that the general level of education is
still incapable of assimilating facts and views which may dislodge traditional methods ~f discharging affect we may expect to find confirmation
of primitive attitudes in the highest places. Indeed, in proportion to the
degree of knowledge available one may even say that we are worse off
23

PARKMAN, THE JESUITS IN NoRTH AMERICA lxxxix (1897).
u LEVY-BRUHL, PRIMITIVE MENTALITY 23 (1923), quoting Fredoux; and id.,
24, 25.
Radin envisages the life of the primitive in terms of activities of a practical nature
that the modern scholar and ethnologist is apt to misunderstand. He refers to monographs
of ethnologists as often developing into "unconsciously distorted presentations of primitive
culture" yet some individuals, totally lacking in scientific training, "but with a welldeveloped sensational side to his nature, can give an inherently more correct picture."
PAUL RADIN, PRIMITIVE MAN AS PHILOSOPHER 14 et seq. at 18 (1927).
See discussion in GEo. W. HENRY, EssENTIALS OF PSYCHIATRY 51 et seq., also 116
(1928).
25
SIR JOHN LUBBOCK (LoRD AVEBURY), PRE-HISTORIC TIMES (1875).
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than the primitives because we have the means of knowing better. And
· we may have good cause to despair of any substantial progress when we
find the Supreme Court of the United States taking the view that in
acting as "supreme arbiter" it must only reflect the level of general
behavior; that, no matter how incorrect, a rule must stay if it is supported
by tradition which has not been dislodged by an out and out cataclysm of
some kind. Even though the evidence by all standards of available
knowledge is inadequate and incompetent a judge has but to invoke the
mana-laden words "history," "ancestors," "continuity" or "tradition"
-these are but a few-to legalize,further the most abject superstition
and support the most primitive fears. In this regard Mr. Justice Holmes
was extremely deficient, for he had found out that a tradition was often
based upon what he considered an unreasoned survival which had lost its ·
meaning. But these very "unreasoned" survivals are in fact psychodynamically reasoned. The reasoning is, however, on a primitive level
which reasons that fear may be dispelled by the simple procedure of
adherence; hence, the survivals represent, in fact, unwillingness to give
up earlier and more primitive patterns.
.
The scientist who is aware of the progress made and the great amount
of information now available about the mental processes must wonder
about the real nature of the judicial function when he reads that the
English common law of centuries back is the authority to be relied upon
in seeking to determine the factors that bear on guilt even though psychodynamic processes are involved. And his wonder is increased when he
finds that Blackstone, who believed in witchcraft and superstition, is
quoted as an authority on the scope which is to be given to an action "of
the mind" in a case involving the determination of what is treason. In
Cramer v. United States, Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, was considering the function of the overt act in showing that the traitorous project
had moved out of the realm of thought into the realm of action and in
an appendix to the opinion we read:
"Blackstone recognizes the distinction between evidence of intent and the overt act: 'But, as this compassing or imagination is an
act of the mind, it cannot possibly fall under any judicial cognizance,
unless it be demonstrated by some open, or overt, act. And yet the
tyrant Dionysius is recorded to have executed a subject, barely for
dreaming that he killed him; which was held for a sufficient proof,
that he had thought thereof in his waking hours. But such is not the
temper of the English law; and therefore, in this, and the three
next species of treason, it is necessary that there appear an open or
overt act of a more full and explicit nature, to convict the traitor
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upon.' When it comes to the offense of adherence to the enemy he
gives examples of adequate overt acts, some of which may be innocent standing by themselves." 26
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority of the Court stated that
"mental attitudes and expressions should not be treason." 21 In other
words, everyone agreed that the issue to be decided was inextricably
connected with the mental nature of the problem.
The amazing thing is that, although everyone recognized they were
dealing with mental dynamisms, in the lengthy opinions and copious
marginal notes and appendix not one reference, be it ancient or modern,
appears to any writings on the subject of mental behavior.28 The vast
advances made by students of mental processes and the enormous quantity of scientific data now available were completely by-passed. While
judicial notice was taken of the writings of historians, articles which_have
appeared in law reviews and other miscellaneous "authorities" no mention is found of the achievements of psychologists or psychiatrists 29 and
their discoveries in the field of human motivation. Had the case involved
wages and hours or the Sherman Anti-trust Law there would have been
( as has been the fact) extensive notes and references in the text of the
opinions and in the margins dwelling upon the economic and sociological,
political and historical aspects of the questions to be considered. The
psychological sciences, which offer the only scientific information which
can be had on the dynamics of human behavior and an attempt at some
synthesis in the complex maze of human motivation, have yet to receive
other than the scantiest notice. For all that would appear from such
26
325 U.S. I at 71, 65 S.Ct. 918 (1944). Justice Holmes once remarked that "all
thought is social, is on its way to action ..•." The remark is, of course, incomplete and
ambivalent on its face. When thought starts its course of action it may use "social"
objectives for a highly personal living through process which is only superficially so but
actually is aggressively motivated. This is so common an occurrence that it hardly needs
example, yet few admit that this is so. The quotation appears in Wigmore's Essay in MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES, edited by Felix Frankfurter, 224 (1931).
27
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. I at 28; 65 S.Ct. 918 (1944).
28
Much space is devoted to determining the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is stated that these men were influenced by eighteenth century liberal thought,
both English and French. It is conceded, however, "that the French influences, more
philosophical than legal in character, were particularly strong with Franklin, who took
a significant part in framing the treason clause. Franklin had been a member of the
French Academy of Sciences since I 772 and had many friends among French intellectuals." Id. at 15, note 21, in opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts.
Thus, the Court took judicial notice of the contribution of science and philosophy
of the Revolutionary period but took no notice of current thought.
29
Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463, 66 S.Ct. 1318 (1946) came later.
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disregard these sciences might as well not exist. Except for a sporadic
unexplained footnote appearing occasionally in a case there has been no
judicial notice applied to this :field of scientific thought. The study of the
mind in action has yet to receive the enlightening benefits of Muller v.
Oregon. 30
b. The avoidance mechanism examined
We have hitherto dwelt upon the aggressive use of principles. But
there is another side to the psychodynamic'approach to the use of principles. It may be considered as another phase of an ambivalent :field of
psychic activity. We refer to the resort to principles--or precedents
as they are called by lawyers-for purposes of avoidance. This seems
paradoxical and may be so labelled if one chooses to substitute it for
ambivalent; but we prefer the latter term because it does not carry with
it so much implication of insolubility. When one uses a precedent to
lighten one's labors there is an element of avoidance of conflict with
environment. The application of previously acquired knowledge is thus
applied to release some of the tension which arises with every cultural
problem to be solved. The fact that it is earlier knowledge is the important thing in such case and not that it is better knowledge, since the earlier
data is already there and does not require experiencing. No doubt in any
cultural life complexity prevails so that this reliance upon past experience
is of value to the individual and society. The distinction is between being
guided by the "prior art" so-to-speak and being dominated by it. Furthermore, the lack of insight into human motivations which generally
obtains makes it easy for persons to pretend to follow principles while
actually following their own impulses. In the latter case freedom of
choice is preserved but it is only the freedom of those who succeed in
having others believe that they have acted with complete detachment.
We have seen that the savage seeks the easy way out of mental labor
and fatigue. The avoidance procedure among civilized peoples serves
the same end, removed only in degree. All persons indulge in avoidance
and not merely the men whom Johnson referred to as the "slow calculators." The avoidance mechanism has pervaded all stages of cultural
experience. In a large sense it has had its beneficial e:ffect when we
consider civilized life as representing continuous attempts to maintain
peace and thus avoid aggressive conflicts. One has cause to wonder why
30

208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324 (1908). In a previous article we pointed out that
even judicial notice is not an adequate means for broadening the evidence base. See
Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MxcH. L. REv. 497
at 515, note 47 (1944).
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it has been so unsuccessful. Perhaps, with good ground it may be
maintained that avoidance is in itself a failure because it is a substitute
mechanism. And, if such be the case, some cognitive substitute or substitutes which would make it possible for people to get along with less
sacrifice of their own personalities at the same time that they were able
to cooperate with like minded persons may in some distant future be
realizable. But for the present we must not permit any "dream" of the
future to entice us away from understanding how we function, no matter
what such investigations may lead to and what habits of mind may be
dislodged.
Let us proceed to a few examples, bearing in mind that we are looking
for evidences of the avoidance device in any and all institutional processes
and especially, since this is a study in legal processes, in judicial, executive,
legislative or any political action.
The drinking ordeal of the Kondes of East Africa is typical, we think,
of primitive procedure. The ordeal of drinking the muavi cup, which
decides between innocence and guilt affords an easy way to settle on a
question of disputed rights. 81 Here the drinking custom furnishes a procedural precedent which solves knotty problems in a very quick way. We
are only degrees removed when we substitute the third degree for an
earnest examination of all of the complex factors which determine legal
guilt. Sir James Fitzj ames Stephen saw the connection between primitive
magical simplicity and the avoidance by modern procedures. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter recently recalled and applied Stephen's insight in McNabb
v. United States, 82 where he condemned the forceful extortion of confessions and rejected the "reprehensible" third degree, saying: "It
outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted
for brains as an instrument of crime detection"; and in the margin he
81
LiVY-BRUHL, PRIMITIVE MENTALITY 221 (1923). Sir Henry Maine found,
this tendency to avoid in legal practice. See MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 52
(1875). See also note 21, supra, and MAINE, PoPULAR GoVERNMENT 171 (1886). It is
not intended here to adopt Maine's theory of inherited characteristics without qualification, even though correct in numbers of instances, since it is a large subject and should not
be treated lightly, even in passing.
One of the commonest forms of avoidance is the effort to avoid an unfavorable solution of one's conflict. The ancient Romans used to solve this difficulty by resorting to
soothsayers and the like. If the animal's head when about to be sacrificed did not tilt
in the right direction it was not uncommon forcibly to turn it in order to have the approval
of the gods. Whitley Stokes, the biographer of Sir Henry Maine, furnishes a more modern
version. He quotes Sir Sayyid Ahmad to the effect that even in Moslem India the statute
book is often preferred to avoid "the mental proclivities of the individual judges before
whom their disputes may have to go for decision." LIFE OF SIR HENRY MAINE 62 ( 1892).
82
318 U.S. 332 at 344, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943).
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aptly quoted an example from Stephen, who had said concerning the
extortion of confessions:" 'There is a good deal of laziness in it. It is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor
devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.'"
Psychodynamically viewed, all vicarious judgment is an avoidance
procedure, whether it be by the magical cup of muavi or red pepper or
the verdict of a jury or the order of a judicial officer. The greater the
sanctity which is attached to the institution or procedure which is invoked
to take over the responsibility of individual 'decision in a situation of
conflict (here the word is employed in its broadest connotations) the
more apparent is it that the individual has admitted his own incapacity.
For when there is a yielding to the magical or the supernatural the individual has given the unknown predominance over the known, the secret
o~er the patent. Hence it is that the rejection of the idea of the divine
right of kings by the American Constitution was a much more significant
mental achievement than is ordinarily realized.
"The result of a belief in magic," warned Allier, "while providing
man with an imaginary explanation, is to end the uneasiness he would
experience in the presence of disconcerting phenomena, to supply him
with grounds for expecting victory over the causes of his fright. Man,
however, pays dearly for what he receives from this belief. Having
therein discovered a solace for his troubled mind he no longer thinks of
seeking elsewhere." 83 For the same reason, evasion is closely linked with
avoidance. If we are" to mark the difference between the two it would
be that in the case of evasion there is an attempt to avoid by conscious
indirection or simulation the law or custom of the group which has
already been accepted as a tolerable means of solving conflict.
c. Generality as avoidance

The commonest of all avoidance mechanisms is, of course, the rational
result we call a "generality" or "principle" or "precedent." While still
a Massachusetts judge, Justice Holmes $aid of Judge Endicott, "I think
of him as not avoiding the difficulties of a case, as not seeking refuge in
generalities ...." 84 We can hardly overlook the findings of anthropologists concerning primitive life when we read what Holmes has observed
about modern life. "But I have no doubt," he wrote, "that the generaliz83

ALLIER, THE MIND OF THE SAVAGE 63 (1927).
SHRIVER, OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, His BooK NoncES AND UNCOLLECTED
PAPERS 130 (1936). Other references to the particular and the general will be found on
pp. 23, 47, 93, 164, 175, 176.
84
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ing principle will prevail, as generalization so often prevails, even in
advance of evidence, because of the ease of mind and comfort which it
brings." 35
The "refuge in generalities" again furnishes an example of ambivalence in that it is so closely linked to the refuge in ambiguity--another
avoidance mechanism. What supplies the ambivalence is that general
principles are meant to clarify situations by providing precedents of
conduct and summations of observations of experience. This is as true
of the laws of physics as the laws passed by the legislature. But the
moment a general law is found it becomes ambiguous until it is applied
to a specific set of facts-and even then it may retain its ambiguity. Hence,
as Johnson said of the contract clause of the Constitution it is "the
motive, the policy, the object, that must characterize the legislative act,
to affect it with the imputation of violating the obligation of contracts.".ss
To find refuge in ambiguity means to avoid a final decision and thus to
ease the mental labor, a disposition which becomes a disease in extreme
situations. If the ambiguity is suddenly resolved the individual may
become panic-stricken because of the strain put upon his emotional
structure. However, every lawyer knows that he spends much of his
time solving ambiguous situations. Ambiguity is not, as some would .
like to believe, a phenomenon of language only: it is an everpresent
phenomenon of experience. 87 It is symbolized in ancient mythology by the
story of the hero at the crossroads who must choose one of two roads; or
avoid the road altogether. The story of the Riddle of the Sphinx tells of
the tragedy which befalls those who "guess" wrong, that is, solve life's
ambiguities incorrectly.
There is a disposition to consider avoidance as an isolated finality and
this appears in some expressions of anthropologists. Avoidance is a means
of withdrawal from danger in all situations if we call living in the world
without adequate knowledge to function well as dangerous. In that sense
one's interest in science is motivated by "fear," although the word, fear,
is an omnibus which carries many passengers. Science proceeds on the
assumption that things have not gone so well that we can rest on our
oars. It does not consider that conflict in the world may be avoided or
85

HoLMEs, CoLLECTED PAPERS 22 3 ( 1920). See also id., 240. (Italics supplied.)
From Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 212 at 291 (1827). See Levin,
"Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: II," 44 M1cH. L.
REv. 243 at 252 (1945). See also id. at 257 for reference to "the nature, object and
terms" of a contract.
87
Id. 248. See also Levin, "Language, Symbol Cycles and the Constitution," 71
U.S. L. REv. 258 at 264 (1937).
·
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should be avoided by supine mental hibernation. Its avoidance objective
is ultimately directed to positive function and the avoidance of the usual
animal status. It is only a partial view to see only one "side" of the
avoidance ambivalence. The "opposite" of withdrawal from danger is
the attraction to the things we require for living even at the risk of danger.
The infant from the moment of birth takes in food. The child runs away
from the cruel parents but responds quickly to the voice of those who he
knows love him. "Taking in" is a vital process, a positive activity and not
an avoidance mechanism. But it may become such when one function
is employed to predominate and blot out others, as when excessive eating
is an unconscious means of allaying other pressures.38

d. Examples of judicial avoidance
Is this discussion of the psychodynamic evidences of avoidance to be
disposed of as "academic" or "theoretical?" Clearly not, because it is
as prevalent today as in earlier primitive times and is the most readily
used mechanism for easing the labor of decision. In an opinion delivered
several years ago, Justice Clark, of the Second Circuit Court of App€als,
remarked that "the pain of decision should not be avoided by reliance
on some procedural technicality." 39 This is not a statement of a primitive
medicine man or shaman but of a modern jurist of outstanding calibre
administering law in an advanced democracy. In other words, there is a
parallelism between the complexity of primitive life and the relatively
greater complexity of modern life which does not, therefore, dispense
with the mechanisms of more primitive civilization. This realization may
hurt one's pride or undermine his feeling hqt it is demonstrated at every
turn as unavoidable fact. The fact that we are cultured does not take
away our pre-cultured human qualities and substitute entirely new ones.
A popular writer suggests a reason why it is that persons are tempted to
regress: "Democracy is no political creed for tired or thoughtless men
and women. This is the chief reason why it has failed absolutely in some
countries, and notably those countries that suffered most from the War
[ the First World War] . When we are nervous, tired, or dreamily
pre-occupied, we do not want to have to make decisions. It is easier to
38 Experiments have been made with animals which have resulted in the .finding that
an organism tends to avoid a stimulus object to be avoided and that this is relevant to
theories of learning. It has been asserted that the effect of a reinforcing stimulus varies
inversely as the remoteness of the stimulus from the act which is reinforced. See Bugeski
and Miller, "A Spatial Gradient in the Strength of Avoidance Response," 23 J. ExP,
PSYCHOLOGY 495 and 505 (1938).
39
Cover v. Schwartz, (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 541 at 550. (Italics supplied.)
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hand over all responsibility and simply obey orders, just as it is much
easier to be a good soldier than a good citizen." 40
Avoidance in some forms is palpable but in many others it is not
easily detected. On the one hand it is a psychodynamic activity in individual life of many external dispositions. 41 But that does not seem to
satisfy. We, therefore, have the other side, namely, the effort of the
individual to make of his avoidances a pattern not only for his life but
for all society. So reliant does the individual become upon these outlets
as methods of self-control that the individual believes that the whole
world must do likewise lest it become uncontrolled. In other words, these
avoidances are also projected onto society and become laws and institutions and methods of administering others. It takes a considerable amount
of detachment-for which few are prepared-to discover one's own
personal "defences" institutionalized into religious, political, literary
and scientific expressions. For example, the doctrine of judicial restraint
has practical value within certain limits but this does not prevent us from
detecting in this a dogma of constitutional interpretation. In a case decided
not very long ago Mr. Justice Frankfurter revealed both sides of the
ambivalence which gives rise to avoidances, that is, the "positive" and
the "negative" sides-words which are used only for want of better ones
at this time. In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. the claim of the
Pullman porters was described as touching "a sensitive area of social
policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open." 42 It must be clear to one who is looking
at the legal and constitutional problem from the dynamic viewpoint that
40

PRIESTLY, RAIN UPON GonsHILL 214 (1939). See also Levin, "Mr. Justice
William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 M1cH. L. REv. 497 at 547 (1944).
Two essays by Judge Learned Hand are extremely frank in their admissions about
the workings of the mind in the judicial process. "To most of us," he declares, "who, like
the defendant in Trial by Jury, love this young lady today, and love that young lady
tomorrow, freedom is a curse; we slink back into our cages however narrow, and our
disciplines howeoer archoic. They are the defenses against the intolerable agony of facing
ourselrJes. We prate of freedom; we are in deadly fear of life, as much of our own
American scene betrays." In MR. JusncE HOLMES, edited by Felix Frankfurter, 129
(1931). See also Judge Hand's essay, id. II9, and another reference to fear, id. 124.
The performance of one's functions under conditions of "intolerable agony" would, of
course, give rise to avoidances and the law which would evolve would be largely colored
by the unconscious and conscious need of the individual to lessen the agony and fear.
Answers to such problems confronting the judicial mind do not appear in the legal
texts or in the case law. (Italics are supplied, except in title, TRIAL BY JURY.)
41
In individual experience avoidance may easily be detected without technical
training if one's observation is not blocked by the very avoidances which are to be
discovered.
42
312 U.S. 496 at 498, 61 S.Ct. 643 (1941).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter was saying-notwithstanding the objective
realities of the situation-that he was sensitive to the conflict to be
resolved. Such sensitivity has frequently been expressed by judges but
the word "delicacy" is more often used. 43 But Mr. Justice Douglas left
no doubts when, in commenting on the Pullman case, he said: "Avoidance
of constitutional adjudications where not absolutely necessary is part of
the wisdom of the doctrine of the Pullman case." 44 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, indeed, yielded in his opinion to the avoidance mechanism when
he said in the Pullman case: "Few public interests have a higher claim
upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless
friction with state policies." 45
e. Natural law as an avoidance
Now, in pointing out these avoidances we are not singling out any
specific individuals as examples of competence or the lack of it. The level
of information on these subjects is yet restricted. We choose our examples
43

The opposite pole of over-zealous belief is an exaggerated sense of delicacy which
is also an avoidance mechanism, as Sir John Lubbock observed in commenting on conversations among primitives. LUBBOCK (LoRD AVEBURY) PRE-HISTORIC TIMES
(1875).
44
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168 at 173, 62 S.Ct. 986 (1942).
(Italics supplied.)
45
312 U.S. 496 at 500, 61 S.Ct. 643 (1941). (Italics supplied.) Recently Mr.
Justice Frankfurter uttered the extreme version of the avoidance mechanism when he
declared in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at 320, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946): "But
the most fundamental principal of constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional
questions but to avoid them, if at all possible." The "authority" for such a statement
cannot possibly rest in fundamental concepts. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's insistence that
the judicial function is one of statesmanship and is a "political" one indicates that the
avoidance is a matter of individual choice depending upon whether the particular judge
feels that the action is or is not urgent. See essay by Felix Frankfurter in MR. JusTICE
HoLMES, edited by Felix Frankfurter, 48 ( 193 I). This is apparent in the very opinion
we have cited where Mr. Justice Frankfurter refuses to consider the motive of the
Congress in enacting a law because the motive was presumed. The majority examined
the background of the law and chose to act upon the constitutional question in order to
determine the object of the law. ,It is as much "history'' to consider the context as it is
to indulge in generalities about fundamental approaches in avoidance of the more laborious task of examining legislative motives. Rules of interpretation about "saving"
legislation are no less dialectic because expressed by Justice Holmes.
Once we appraise a situation as involving "needless friction" we have already implied
that communication is on a plane to be avoided, that is, the positive element of resolution
of conflict is not the concern of the courts. This has little to do with whether legally the
courts should or should not interpose in a positive way. See discussion of the Duke of York's
case (1460) in Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma,"
42 MicH. L. REv. 803 at 828 (1944). The judges there belittled their own learning
and avoided the conflict pertaining to the decision on the title to the Crown. From a more
objective viewpoint the, question is, rather, whether the action to be reviewed represents
another step to better communication irrespective of narrow political implications. Is it
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because they are illustrative of psychodynamic processes as related to
institutional development and application. When we have chosen an
individual it is because his individuality is reflected in a psychodynamic
result which is characteristic of all persons to greater or lesser degree.
We would refrain from the method of becoming a :flaying protagonist.
There is so much to do to advance our understanding even in small
measure that sweeping condemnations in broad terms of those who have
contributed to the advancement of the human mind-even though partially incomplete or even erroneous-are evidence of the avoidance of
the hard labor of analytic thought. Mr. Ben W. Palmer's recent indictment of Holmes and modern thinkers is presumably in the interest of
furnishing something to take the place of the apparent "lack of synthesis."
But the harshness of his attacks betrays a resentment toward those
who would not see the world as he sees it, that is, in an ordered and
systemized configuration, either concealed forever from human knowledge, or concealed until a majority votes on what is natural. It is clear
that disturbances of the mystic natural pattern must, according to Palmer,
be scolded and labelled into submission as is evident from the treatment
accorded the pragmatists, whose principal "fault" must be that they
added a bit of courage to those who would undertake the unpleasant
work of uncovering some facts about human motivations-before attempting to synthesize: "It is a counterfeit philosophy answering none of
the great philosophical questions as to ultimates arising out of man's
another evidence of the "expansive powers" of the human mind or rather a drawing in
for temporary safety reasons?
46
"Defense Against Leviathan," 32 A.B.A.J. 328 at 332 (1946). {Italics supplied.)
It is seldom pointed out, moreover, that natural law doctrine is related to compulsory
reminiscence, looking backward and thinking and acting with a retroactive inclination.
The idea of present selection is "dangerous." Man is, accordingly, incapable. Only those
who lived before us had the wisdom, or else pre-existing fact (natural law) has furnished,
by some magical communication, the answers to our problems. It is a regression to the
primitive rather than a human advance, or, to borrow Judge Learned Hand's candid
words, it is slinking "back into our cages however narrow, and our disciplines however
archaic." (Supra, note 40.) See VERRILL, THE INQUISITION 15 (1931) •.
Strangely enough, a better case can be made out for stare decisis than its proponents
have shown. As "prior art" the decisions of the past offer guidance but still preserve the
element of choice which is liberty modified by experience. The search for "equivalents"
has value but it is not the only value. For an earlier discussion of retroactivity and the
search for certainty, see Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: I," 44 MICH. L. REv. 59 at 107-108 (1945).
The avoidance mechanisms are discernible in too many situations to be fully set out
here. A common example is excessive literalism which furnished a well-marked path for
action; but on a reality level literality may mean improved communication rather than
reliance on the past.
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perennial effort to interpret the universe. It offers its adherents an
avoidance of those questions and invites them to live from day to day in
successive mansions of scepticism or eclecticism." 46 Anyone who has really
attempted to understand the universe can hardly be chargeable with
avoidance, in all fairness, if he is first trying scientifically to direct his
individuality toward elimination of those deceptions of mind which are
in fact avoidances. The natural law doctrine has from the very beginning
been a psychodynamic endeavor on the part of individuals to do as they
pleased but to avoid responsibility for the decision made. It is the most
common and obvious example of avoidance there is. The ordeal of early
English law-and other systems-with its cruelties was always under
divine (natural law) guidance which "decided" the issue so that the
parties and all concerned were able to avoid coming face to face with the
realities of their acts. It is quite true that the pragmatists have not
furnished us with any final answers about the riddles of the universe or
a complete synthesis of everytjiing. But William James and others before
him and after him with their pragmatism as a dissenting method thereby
opened the mind--even though only a little-and freed it from its
natural law imprisonment. Man's capacity for choice became a realityif he so chose. If to be able to exercise choice is an avoidance then, indeed,
natural law may equate for Mr. Palmer the very ideas he deems so obnoxious. It is the most serious of afflictions to which all of mankind is
addicted-an ailment of civilization which must be accorded all of the
careful therapy which is now applied to more secondary ailments-that
those who speak of one thing are only revealing a part of what the psychiatrists call the "syndrome." The same ones who speak of liberty with the
intensest fervor often insist on the most rigid conceptions of stare decisis
and those who oppose authoritarian political control insist on an authoritarian ideological control be it natural law or pure law. It is not the
inconsistency which is deplored but the failure to be aware of what is
going on within one's self, for the psychology of the group reflects that
of the individual.
Natural law doctrine makes possible the emphasis on the appearance of
similarities rather than upon the real existence of equivalents. If authority
is in the unknown then there must be a medium who communicates the
will of the unknown. History has shown that the medium has always
too readily relied upon signs and omens which are either handed down or
are conveniently used as the leverages of power. It is convenient to have
an index of the complex; but it is still another thing to worship it or to be
mentally enslaved by it. The prevailing notion of law too often pictures

1 949]

JUSTICE JOHNSON

a shelf upon which legal volumes rest which contain the answer to the
riddle of life if one would but open it. It is not so much better laws that
we need-this notion implies-but better digests. That this certainly is
an ambivalent sort of thing is almost always overlooked although those
who do so would admit that they are trying to preserve liberty by means
of precedent. It is a psychodynamic question we are dealing with here and
not the usual controversial debate which invites a political partisanship.
We are concerned rather with the picture of the drowning man clutching
to straws which he imagines to be life-rafts.
If law is to mean the compulsive adherence to precedent not only for
the immediate practical needs of cooperative living but for the avowed
aim of stifling the mind's function then it is, indeed, a defunct science.
This substitution of belief in precedent for choice is the very denial of
everything democratic government stands for. But choice without knowledge, except in those rare instances of unusual insight, means the opening
of Pandora's box. Even the brilliant mind trained in the material sciences
is glad for the respite which comes with the rule which seems to lead out
of the maze of perplexity. Choice arouses opposition from those who are,
for reasons most often unknown to them, unwilling to indulge in it or are
unable to do so or actually do so by indirection. This has always been so.
Choice under these conditions very often means dissent and only the few
practice it openly. The primitive and later American are hedged about
by a set of conventions whose breach may subject them to indignity,
ostracism and death. Hence it is that "the unpardonable sin," as Johnson's
forced departure from South Carolina indicates, consists in setting up
one's private judgment against recognized social authority, in perpetrating an infraction of private taboos. 47
47
Lowrn, PRIMITIVE SocIETY 440 (1920). See also by the same author ARE WE
CIVILIZED? (1929).
William Graham Sumner has summarized the reaction of dissent on the group:
"Since it appears that the old mores are mischievou.s if they last beyond the duration
of the conditions and needs to which they were adapted, and that constant, gradual,
smooth, and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to healthful
life, it follows that free and rational criticism of traditional mores is essential to societal
welfare. We have seen that the inherited mores exert a coercion on every one born in the
group. It follows that only the greatest and best can react against the mores so as to modify
them. It is by no means to be inferred that every one who sets himself at war with the
traditional mores is a hero of social correction and amelioration. The trained reason and
conscience never have heavier tasks laid upon them than where questions of conformity
to, or dissent from, the mores are raised. It is by the dissent and free judgment of the
best reason and conscience that the mores win flexibility and automatic readjustment.
Dissent is always unpopular in the group. Groups form standards of orthodoxy as to the
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7. Psychodynamic Aspects of Precedent
The psychodynamic effect of precedent is at least twofold. It not only
eases labor of the mind and therefore furnishes relief but it also offers
extensive possibilities for the positive transfers of feeling toward the
precedent system. This latter phenomenon is recognizable as magic or
superstition and appears in all mystic attachments to history or tradition.
What the primitives call mana is really much simpler than some anthropologists would have us believe. Psychodynamically it is largely a
projection of one's own self-esteem with some mixtures of a variety of
unmixed aggressions or functions outwardly displaced. Thus, the individual invests with mana a part of what he considers valuable in himself
but he does not so believe. He prefers to think and feel that it is the
amulet, or the talisman, or the sacred cow, the totem, the man of importance, or the law which independently possesses the cardinal qualities
which really emanate from him. Usually the mana acts also as a brake on
the very person who feels its influence; hence it is likewise a mechanism
of self-control useful on a primitive level. What seems to be too welcome
to the rationalizing mind is the submission to some authority most often
of its own choosing-forgetting for the moment the question of the influence of environmental forces. The search for· precedent, the anxious
groping for some authority and the avidity with which this exploration
becomes allied with the mystic are no doubt due in large measure to a
knowledge of the lot which befalls the dissenter. From earliest time man
has been unwilling to dissent. And even though he is in fact rebellious he
prefers to conceal the fact and to envisage his rebellion in terms of social
purpose. The strong attachment to traditions and superstitions becomes
a way of holding rebellion in check and is of itself evidence of the inadequacy of other present methods of individual and social control. The
psychodynamic approach to the problem is only in its early stages but
has already revealed the crudeness of the means and also the almost
complete lack of willingness to understand on the part of the largest
portion of the world population.
a. Mental relief
It is not our purpose, as must already appear, to bring forth Justice
Johnson as the perfect judge, though he was extraordinarily competent
'principles' which ea~h member must profess and the ritual which each must practice.
Dissent seems to imply a claim of superiority. It evokes hatred and persecution. Dissenters
are rebels, traitors, and heretics. We see this in all kinds of subgroups. Noble and patrician
classes, merchants, artisans, religious and philosophical sects, political parties, academies
and learned societies, punish by -social penalties dissent from, or' disobedience to, their
code of group conduct." F_oLKWAYS, 95 (1906).
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when judged by standards of his day and even by those of ours. He was
the first judicial officer in the modern era who attempted to pierce the
artificial veil of culture, but he was far from being entirely free from
the emotive pressures to which all humans are subjected.
The interplay of conflicting motivations is detectable to the watchful
observer when he reads in one of Johnson's opinions such words as these:
"It is a relief to us to find that there has been an expressed adjudication
on both these points," 48-an unmistakable admission of the function of
precedent in lightening the judge's mental labor. Here is no mere
amenity of opinion writing. It is a frank confession and demonstration of
how the psychic economy works and is removed only in slight degree
from the same psychodynamism when found in primitive mentality. The
significance of the statement is further accentuated when it is recalled
that the case was one involving the choice of freedom or bondage, the
possible liberation of a Negress and her three children from slavery.
Unconscious forces are easily unbalanced by the disturbance of situations
in which slavery is involved. Conflicts arising out of the rejection of the
practice of shackling of human freedom or the desire to enslave or subordinate others are easily roused into dynamic action. Witness the Civil
War. It is a relief to avoid them.
The continual conflict, which is a dominant characteristic of a culture
which sees too sharply the outlines of the duality of individual and
society, be it family, tribe or state, leaves its unmistakable traces of an
alliance with that Janus-faced psychodynamism known as ambivalence.
When a judge prides himself upon his intuition-as many do-he is
saying in effect that he possesses an uncanny ability to disregard or cut
through precedent at the same time that he is applying it. He resolves
the duality in favor of his own individuality but does so ambivalently.
Thus, there is an element of dissent in the exercise of "intuition." The
one who successfully solves the conflict by "intuition" may indeed find
extra relief; for, he is not only acting individualistically-because he
believes he is not bound by the rules-but he actually believes that his
ability lies in being able to sort out and detect the applicable rules and to
invoke them for the purposes of decision. Ther~ is a feeling of magical
omnipotence which goes with intuitive thinking. The "sovereignty of
choice" is a species of dissent. The anarchical and individualistic choice
which democracy tends to encourage is seldom formless. The individual
finds it inconvenient and often impossible to act according to ideals, plans
48
Mason v. Matilda, 12 Wheat. (25 u·.s.) 589 at 591 (1827). A similar remark
appears in Patapasco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 222 at 233 (1830).
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or configurations. Thus, dynamic energy-sometimes termed unrest or
dissatisfaction-may find its outlets in a strong wish for peace, that is,
personal peace. In extreme cases the pressure of dissent is so strong that
nothing short of a state of euphoria will suffice to quiet destructive
impulses.

b. Dissent and the manic and depressive states
A psychodynamic analysis of dissent cannot stop with the glib and
commonplace characterizations of dissent and dissenters, and yet at the
same time it must give effect to the underlying reasons why persons rely
on such valuations. These reasons are the unmistakable evidence of the
very process we ai;-e trying to examine objectively. To be more specific,
the critics are part of the psychodynamic scene-be they dull or brilliant.
Modern psychiatry teaches that the difference between the so-called
normal ·behavior and abnormal behavior is of degree and not of kind.
From such a vantage point one gains very little as to the nature of dissent
and correlative acquiescence--called "law"-from such labels as "radical" or "conservative," though one does learn something about those who
employ the terms recklessly. The most superficial investigation reveals
that the minority conservative is also a radical and dissenter. Psychiatry,
venturing into normal behavior, might, we believe, find in such ambivalences the evidence of what in more extreme cases is noticed as the oscillation between manic and depressive phases of personality; and, proceeding
to the group, might discover in the "mass neuroses" of war, riot and
insurrection and hatred movements the diffusion of individual affect and
its patterns of discharge. We might then find that dissent contains more
of the element of the manic phase and that excessive insistence on conformity partakes more of the depressive phase, with its attendant pullback to compulsive repetitory behavior. Nor should it surprise or startle
the scientifically inclined person who is capable _of some detachment to
learn that dissent may be put to the task-as has so often been the case
throughout history-of achieving some sort of compulsory order which
it opposes in the beginning. This does not necessarily mean that it must
be so. After allowing for the need for compulsion, when dealing with
levels of education where no better procedures have been devised, the
highest aim of creative dissent must be the continual diminution of the
orbit of compulsion and the extension of the scope of understanding and
individual choice.
While dissent may also become an avoidance mechanism-as where
great inner tension is relieved by inciting disagreement and by provocation of controversies which serve as immediate occasions for psychic
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relief-dissent performs the positive function of furnishing the check
on compulsive processes. There are many excessively strict consciences
abroad whose possessors mistake their own inner pressures for the needs
of society. The imposition of one's own conscience demands upon others
furnishes many nefarious instances of the workings of the avoidance
mechanism. A familiar pattern is to project one's own difficulties to the
outside world and this makes possible considerable personal relief as
the experience with political dictators and the many other innumerable
cases would reveal. As is usually the case, these persons are also dissenters
against what they have chosen as the objective of their attacks.
c. Conscience

A reason for the fact that the dissenter is often a sad and depressive
person may be deduced from what Charles Darwin said about conscience
even before modern psychiatry began to study such questions systematically. He observed that in the moment of action man will no doubt be
apt to follow his stronger impulse but that after gratification "the social
instinct" brings about retribution. "He will then," added Darwin, "feel
remorse, repentance, regret or shame.... He will consequently resolve
more or less firmly to act differently for the future; and this is conscience; and conscience looks backward and serves as a guide for the
future." 49 It is now known that "conscience," whatever be its cause, is
at the root of every mental illness and depressive c:ondition. It is what
causes people to fear to dissent as contrasted with refraining from dissenting voluntarily.
The meaning of "conscience," notwithstanding efforts to define it,
is by no means clearly outlined or fixed; nor is its function always
apparent. Enough scientific data is available for us to say that it
is a psychic mechanism of communication variously employed. It is,
therefore, a legal mechanism. The individual controls himself and is
49
DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, c. 4 (1874). Conscience may be viewed by
the student of jurisprudence as a partly automatic or unconscious precedent-following
procedure. The following, more modern explanation, also includes Darwin's analysis:
that conscience is a relic of the prohibitions on aggressiveness imposed in childhoodinhibiting aggressive acts before they get started in overt form. DOLLARD, FRUSTRATION
AND AGGRESSION 86 (1939). Since dissent is an aggressive activity, conscience serves to
inhibit its emergence in its very beginnings. See comments on the "indisposition" of the
members of the Supreme Court in former days to dissent, WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW
( 1940). The reasons often given are rationalization5--5uch as the need to maintain the
credit of the Court lest it be weakened. The Court then becomes the symbol of each judge's
conscience. Modern psychiatry has spent much of its efforts on the study of the harmful
and beneficial operations of what is called "conscience" as psychodynamic processes.
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controlled by it. Conscience may supply to the individual the prohibitory
injunction against murder more effectively than the criminal code. When
it breaks down, the criminal code goes with it. Conscience is the internalized censor--often a much needed J avert in the mind of a saint; for even
the saint does not always recognize the degree to which his saintliness is
unconsciously self-controlled.
This pull-back resides not only in presently suppressed sources of
unconscious motivation but has its outcroppings in every day mannerisms
and, indeed, in judicial expressions. Diplomatic politeness, which is
-. almost universal, is seductive beca\[se of the inability of the political
world to face what appears to it as the aggressive force of fact--often
called truth. The man who says "I am sorry I cannot agree with you"
attests, notwithstanding the edicts of etiquette, to his fear of becoming
a dissenter. And so it is also with the letter-writer who "begs to advise,"
although the expression here is often chosen automatically. It is a seemingly trivial but striking evidence of man's fear and his willingness in
the face of social pressure to indulge in self-humiliation.
The business of being a critic of man's compromises with his aggressions has always been a hard one. The critic must be able to understand,
lest he assume the role of the martyr, that everpresent ambivalence
whereby the mind of man at one and the same time finds refuge from
disorganizing impulsive action in identification with authority and, then,
in reaction to the restraint seeks to avoid the very subordination it has
invented.
8. Mental Processes of the Judges
The judicial process is not a thing apart, though many would have
it so. Judges employ the run-of-the-mine psychodynamisms of every
day society. The judge also says in his own stilted style: "I am sorry but
I cannot agree with you," or "I regret that I must take this course," or "It
pains us ...." Johnson's first dissent in ex parte Bollman which arose out
of the Aaron Burr conspiracy, begins with these words: "I have the misfortune to dissent from the majority of my brethren. As it is a case of
much interest I felt it incumbent upon me to assign reasons upon which
. I adopt the opinion that this Court has no authority to issue the writ of
habeas corpus now moved for." 50 And several years later in Pierce v.
Turner he repeated this psychodynamism when he confessed that he was
"unfortunate enough to dissent from his brethren." 51 and in Mills v.
50
51

4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 75 at IOI (1807). (Italics supplied.)
5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 154 at 168 (1809). (Italics supplied.)
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Duryea,52 some years later, he used the identical language last quoted
to introduce his dissent. Thus, with all his boldness, Johnson feared.
This reluctance on the part of Johnson is not to be summarily brushed
aside as due, perhaps, to an over-aggressivity on his part compelling him
to compensate by a show of remorse, as something that was "peculiar" to
Johnson. Chief Justice Marshall, who was at times impatient with
Johnson and certainly was not sympathetic to his continual dissenting,
selected even more apologetic language in his dissent in one of his rare
dissents, United States v. Dandridge:

"I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to
differ from this court, acquiesce silently in its opinion, did I not
believe that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Virginia gave
general surprise to the profession, and was generally condemned.
A full conviction that the commission of even gross error, after
deliberate exercise of the judgment, is more excusable than the
rash and hasty decision of an important question, without due
consideration, will, I trust, constitute some apology for the time
I consume in stating the reasons and the imposing authorities which
guided the Circuit Court iri the judgment that has been reversed." 53
It is no mere coincidence that almost the very words which Johnson
chose to express his inner resistance to oppose the majority appear in
the later dissents of Mr. Justice Holmes; nor do we, in ruling out the
chance factor, imply that there was any imitation on the part of Holmes,
when he began his dissent in Chanler v. Kelsey with these words: "I have
the misfortune to di ff er from the majority of my brethren in this case....,
I think that the principles involved are of such importance as to justify
a statement of the reasons of my dissent." 54
52
7 Cranch (II U.S.) 481 at 485 (1813).
Also in Daly's Lessee v. James, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 494 at 540 (1823), where he
said: "On this point, therefore, I concur with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and
only regret that I cannot concur both with that Court and this on the other bequest."
(I tali cs supplied.)
58
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 64 at 89 (1827).
54
205 U.S. 466 at 479, 27 S.Ct. 550 (1907). (Italics supplied.) Also in Kepner
v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 at 134, 24 S.Ct. 797 (1904), where he said: "I regret
that I am unable to agree with the decision of the majority of the Court," and Muhlker v.
N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 at 571, 25 S.Ct. 522 (1905); Madisonville Traction
Co. v. St. Bernard Co., 196 U.S. 239 at 257, 25 S.Ct. 251 (1905). (Italics supplied.)
Mr. Justice Woodbury declared that he had "the misfortune to differ" in Wilson
v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 646 at 692 (1846).
Mr. Justice Curtis who sat with Chief Justice Taney on the Supreme Court wrote
at one time of his experience: "On the only important occasion which I had the misfortune
to differ from the Chief Justice on such points, I thought he, and they who agreed with
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The way of the dissenter is not a psychological bed of roses, whether
in the ordinary communications of daily life, in the field of religion, in
the challenge to the presuppositions of science, in politics or in the
exercise of the judicial function. If there is aggression behind dissent so
is there, then, some remorse, at times more intense than others. We are,
accordingly, justified in drawing a conclusion from primitive life and
the psychic experience of contemporary peoples in our culture. We refer
to the custom of resorting to the protection of a talisman or its equivalent,
the magic word. These are expiatory and are meant to act as a charm
against retaliatory forces. It makes it easier to dissent if one knows that
a magical routine expression can cure some of the danger. Atonement is
the concomitant of "sin" and there is no greater "sin" in the mind, as
it is trained in our culture, than to disagree or, even worse, wish to disagree, to commit the crime which the Japanese called having "dangerous
thoughts."
Once Johnson took pen in hand and overcame his original resistance
he did not falter in expressing "a strong opinion in opposition to that
of the Court." 55 And this was true also in the case of Holmes who, quite
determinedly, wrote in the famous dissent in Northern Securities v.
United States: "I am unable to agree with the judgment of the majority
of the Court and, although I think it useless and undesirable as a rule to
express dissent, I feel bound to do so in this case and give my reasons
for it." 56

B. Exploration of Self-Serving Declarations as Origin of Dissent
I. The Ambivalent Nature of Holmes' Reluctance to Dissent
In exploring for the psychodynamic origins of dissent we are not
bound by self-serving declarations any more than is the judge in a trial
who rules out such evidence as inadmissible. The difference is that the
judge excludes the evidence with the finality which long-continued
him, carried the powers of the Court too far." Quoted in STEINER, LIFE OF RoGER
BROOKE TANEY 323 (1922). (Italics supplied.)
55
Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria, 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 49 at 54 (1809).
56
193 U.S. 197 at 400, 24 S.Ct. 436 (1904).
Justice Holmes was most outspoken about the reasons for a reluctance in his dissent
in Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 S.Ct. 426 (1927). See pp. 445,446, where he says:
"We fear to grant power and are unwilling to recognize it when it exists••.. It is covered
by apologetic phrases like the police power ••• police power often is used ... to apologize •
. . • I do not believe in such apologies ••.." And it should be noted that he gives fear
its place in judicial conduct though he disapproves of it while speaking of the action of
others. Thus his attitude is ambivalent. At the same time that he yields to fear he
condemns it in his associates. This is common and not a mechanism peculiar to him.
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precedent so often evokes. Our procedure, on the contrary, is not to
consider such evidence as taboo or something evil but to weigh it for
the light it may shed on the dark origins of such self-analysis. Consequently, when Holmes declares that he thinks it "useless and undesirable" to dissent we must place this sweeping generalization against the
fact that he preached dissent and did in fact dissent with relish and insight.
The facts thus deny the denial even though he may expatiate about the
need for continuity, which is hardly reconcilable unless upon psychodynamic factors, with his inveighing against the compulsion of tradition.
Few men, no matter how great, escape the pressures of the rationalizing
process even though they believe they are as flint against them. An
examination of only a few instances will reveal the correctness of this
statement as applied to Holmes. But we do not execrate. Holmes was
not a hypocrite nor may we challenge his integrity because he was patently
inconsistent psychologically. Nor is it basic to say, as did one popular
biographer, that he "hated to dissent, that he by no means desired to be
known as fighter, reformer, or dissenter...." 57 That Holmes said such
things is true but so many facts of a contrary nature could be produced
as to render such generality innocuous so far as its value in a psychodynamic study is concerned. For example, consider the repeated insistence
that life was action; and his conception of language-with which we have
heretofore expressed disagreement-as "the skin of a living thought"
which may vary according to the circumstances; or his idea that society
was an organism. 58 All of these expressions indicate an inward urge to let
the creative impulses have their way even though the conflict was so
great as to evoke a strong denial. We must probe beyond popular notions
to discover the unmistakable evidence that Holmes was throughout his
life depressed by fear-a fear so strong as to have driven him to extremes
of pessimism and mental depression which he did not hesitate to reveal
in his philosophic utterances although he was hardly aware of the strength
of his conflict. His fear was a fear of himself, of the powerful dissenting
forces within himself. Because of the pressure of these upon his personality, he was unconsciously forced into a mechanism of self-control which
involved the denial of the emergence of these forces. We may examine
a few of these confessions, although it is fairly certain that Holmes would
have repudiated their value in the scientific study of his judicial method.
57
BowEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS 375 (1944). It is not intended by this critique
for scientific reasons to deprecate the work as a whole which reveals many facts of the
early life of Holmes which an author with less insight would have overlooked.
58
For the writer's criticism, see "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable
Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 803 at 814 (1944).
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Projection of Holmes' Fear of Himself
While both Johnson and Holmes on occasions considered it a "misfortune" to dissent it seems that Johnson had the element of fear in his
makeup rather well in hand whereas Holmes was much more ambivalent.
Johnson viewed fear more objectively and consistently and was less
depressed by it. While we do not have much more than his writings to go
by we find evidences of a better emotional structure in Johnson than in
Holmes. One may conjecture that this was due in no small degree to a
better infancy and childhood but any conclusion on this score must await
further evidence. Johnson was a more jovial and optimistic man, hopeful
of man's place in the universe if he would but set to work on the capacities
of his mind. There is more resignation in Holmes' writing which has
all but obscured the powerful creative impulses which he so often
belittled. While Holmes saw great possibilities in the study of unconscious motivations he did little more than acknowledge that they .had to
· be reckoned with.
Holmes was essentially a sad and lonely man despite his friendships
and his interests. His eminence and achievements did not resolve his
downcast mood. Such things are ~atters of study and not of castigation
if the future of mankind is to avoid some of its past errors. In the understanding of how such emotive factors of individual behavior affect society
lies the key to the jurisprudence of the future and its implementation.
A critic, who would in three paragraphs thrice speak "of a great danger of
infection in the realm of thought" due to the "absolutist" philosophy of
Holmes at the same time that he calls attention to his "pragmatism" and
his failure to offer any check "to experiments with human beings as
legislative guinea pigs," 59 is hardly aware of the ambivalent nature of
2.

69
Ben W. Palmer in "Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler," 3 I A.B.A.J. 569 at 570
and 573 (1945). This article and subsequent ones are highly animated attacks on the
progress of man in his seeking to answer his enigmas by first analyzing his own mental
processes. The difference which this critic seems to cause to stand out is the use of fear
by projecting it outwardly rather than toward an objectively evaluated creative purpose.
The presence in Mr. Palmer's article of such phrases as "danger of infecting those
within our castle," "delousing processes or probationary quarantines" and "the seeds
of poison weeds in the gardens of our souls" (id. at 570) may be psychodynamically
compared with the fear of infection which overcame the residents of Charleston. See
46 M1cH. L. REv. 175 et seq. Despite these criticisms it is easy to point out that in the
above article, and the later ones following it, Mr. Palmer discloses some of the outstanding
features of the Holmes attack. He condemns Holmes for his poetic language while at
the same time rendering his thesis almost subservient to linguistic flourish and introduces
a later article with a sonnet of his own creation dealing with liberty and order and
horror of chaos, brutality and disorder. "Liberty and Order: Conflict and Reconciliation,"
32 A.B.A.J. 731 (1946). He rebukes Holmes' theory of force but speaks of surcease
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his own thought processes or those of Justice Holmes. Apparently
Holmes is condemned for manifesting absolutist trends which are obviously counterbalanced by experiment but somehow or other this is
supposed to differ from absolutism in the garb of natural law under
which the individual manages pragmatically to choose his destiny but
really does not appear to do so. We remain unconvinced, for it was
Holmes who, as much as anyone of our day, awakened law and politics
and philosophy from an absolutist lethargy. We think there must be
some study of psychodynamic processes lest reproof is authoritatively
substituted for understanding. We may then discover fear of danger in
unlooked for places. All are subject to some "fear" which implies protection of one's self against the elements in the world about us which may
cause us harm-nor do we exclude ourselves from its operation. But it is
the recognition of its exaggerated place which distinguishes scientific
objectivity from highly personalized faultfinding.
There has always been something of evil attached to inconsistency.
This is because more has been expected of the average person than his
training or insight permits him to fathom. And what is true of the average
is true also among the most careful thinkers who have for the most
part had to gain their knowledge of psychodynamic processes through
their own suffering and insight--such as it was. The conscious resort to
falsity and inconsistency is still to be condemned and rejected by better
knowledge because of the practical needs of social communication. But
inconsistency in those profound thinkers who have stirred the mind of
the world is a matter for study only and there is no place for condemnation in such instances. Everyone is subject to the ambivalences 60 of life
from the fatiguing pressure of ideas at war with each other. Indeed, the essays are
replete with warnings about the enemy against whom society must be prepared. He
criticizes Holmes for his pragmatism but agrees with Holmes that it's what we believe in
that counts, for he tells us that the historian knows that what moves people is not the truth
"but what they believe to be true." "The Historian and The Lawyer," 32 A.B.A.J. 530 at
5 3 z ( I 946). As to the last-quoted statement, it is the view of the writer of this article
that Holmes never wholly subscribed to pragmatic doctrine. The idea that had to
fight for its place in the market might be a false one but so might it be a correct one.
Too many statements emanating from Holmes on the importance of science in law would
bear proof that there was no magic in the conquering idea. Rather did he warn that
without struggle the idea might never see the light; that there was something in fighting
for faith in ideas. The fact that an idea worked did not give it final validity. Experiment,
as is implied by Holmes' utterances, is a mental process and not a measure of worth.
00
Honesty which is often equated with consistency is usually considered a matter
of conscience but psychodynamically this does not necessarily follow. People refer to
a severe critic in Congress, for example, as an honest politician when they really mean to say
that he is a strong dissenter irrespective of party affiliation. Thus, honesty is a switch-word
not unlike a pun, that is, it refers to the group standards of conscience and also may describe
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and those who can detect them are yet few. With this thought let us
probe a little further into Holmes' thinking and personality, realizing
full well that precise formulation at such a distance is to furnish us with
some perspective rather than a detailed picture.

3. Loneliness as a Means of Self-Control
His prevailing mood was clearly that of despair. What has been
missed by his adulators as well as his critics must be taken into account
by anyone who attempts a dynamic appraisal. His seeming submission to
authority in specific instances was really an identification with the lack of
it; his yielding to the majority was the initiation of a psychodynamic
process which made it possible for an institution to exist which could
change its "mind" as time and circumstance required. We have already
seen that with Jolinson he did not have a high estimate of the use the
average person made of his mind. It would, therefore, run contrary to
his innermost feelings to attach any real finality to the will of the majority. His attitude toward the majority well-nigh reached that of open
and avowed contempt the intensity of which without doubt, even though
supported by anthropologic fact, had its roots in earliest childhood experiences. He once told the students at Brown University that the man of
high ambition "must leave even his fellow adventurers and go forth
into a deeper solitude and greater trials. He must start for the pole.
In plain words he must face the loneliness of original work." 61 Here,
certainly, is no mental genuflection, no surrendering to the absolute
sovereign of the particular moment be it the sovereignty of one or of
many. It is because he despaired so at the prospect of working alone in
a world that refused to understand that he unconsciously devised the
mechanism of working through the majority, of achieving results by
the vigorous opposition of group demands. Puns are linguistic-as distinguished from
actual--solutions of conflict. The verbal identity simulates an actual identity and humor,
though "low-grade" for that very reason results. It is significant, however, that conscience
when it is off guard considers opposition to itself as being according to code. Honesty in
such case means emotional integrity, which is a principal characteristic of childhood.
The child's keenness to a sense hypocrisy is his greatest mental asset but in a world
which puts a premium on rationalization he must soon, unfortunately, give this up for
politeness and other forms of placative conduct. This is itself the cause of much conflict
and often appears in judicial conduct. It results in the curious inversion which approves
of the "honesty" of youth and its straightforwardness at the same time that it disapproves
of the spirit of rebellion as evidence of immature conduct. See Levin, "Mr. Justice
William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 803 at 809 and 8 IO
and notes (1944).
61 From Commencement Address delivered in l 897, HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 165 (1920).
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means of it. It is a sad commentary on civilization that such a course
should be necessary but the existence of the compelling circumstances
cannot be gainsaid. "I will but add a word," he said to the Bar of Boston
in r 900: "We are all very near despair. The sheathing that :fl.oats us over
its waves is compounded of hope, faith in the unexplainable worth and
sure issue of effort, and the deep, sub-conscious content which comes from
the exercise of our powers"; and then he spoke to the young men who
heard him of "long years of doubt, self-distrust, and solitude." 62 The
best known of his earlier exhortations to independence of thought is
also perhaps the most emotionally charged:
"No man has earned the right to intellectual ambition until he
has learned to lay his course by a star which he has never seen-to
dig by the divining rod for springs which he may never reach. In
saying this, I point to that which will make your study heroic. For I
say to you in all sadness of conviction, that to think great thoughts
you must be heroes as well as idealists. Only when you have worked
alone-when you have felt around you the black gulf of solitude
more isolating than that which surrounds the dying man, and in hope
and in despair have trusted to your own unshaken will-then only
will you have achieved. Thus only can you gain the secret isolated
joy of the thinker, who knows that, a hundred years after he is dead
and forgotten, men who never heard of him will be moving to the
measure of his thought-the subtle rapture of a postponed power,
which the world knows not because it has no external trappings, but
which to his prophetic vision is more real than that which commands
an army. And if this joy should not be yours, still it is only thus that
you can know that you have done what it lay in you to d~an say
that you have lived, and be ready for the end."as
Poetic language? Surely, the feeling which gave voice to these innermost
thoughts cannot be charged with misleading intent since few are even
capable of such candid self-revelation. It is part of the conflict which
civilization presents which leads one to speak in poetry what people
might not listen to if said in ordinary prose. For, what Holmes is saying
62

Id. 248-249.
From "The Profession of the Law" delivered in 1886, id. 31-32. (Italics
supplied.) It should be especially noted that in the quoted passage Holmes speaks of the
prophetic vision which is "more real than that which commands an army." In other
words, in a world which has relied upon force there is no avoiding it until men know
better; but the reality of existence to him was the realm of thought-no doubt more so
than in most individuals. The army came after the mind, even though he saw the need for
ideas using the army in the struggle of existence. The advocacy of force is often equated
for the recognition of force as an ultimate value. But the two are not the same.
63
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here is, more prosaically stated, that after all it is not the majority which
counts but the individual, that it is only the "unshaken will" of the
dissenter which may, even at the risk of death, overcome the imprisoning
force of social compulsion; that the joy of seeking the unknown is also
the realization of intellectual ambition in a world which forces one to
retire to the "secret isolated joy of the thinker." No absolutism here!
While these thoughts spurred him on, the fear.within him was great
and pressing. It was this fear which at times motivated the expression
of the other phase of the ambivalence, namely, the command aspect of
the law. But throughout his writings there is always present the idea that
the law as practical matter was one thing and the mind of man which
must transcend legal commands is still another. At no time did he resign
completely. Thus, he envisaged the law as the stern command of a
woman sitting by the wayside and cautioned the wretch who would defy
her sacred commands because he who "has thought to creep through
ways where she was not, finds that his path ends with her, and beholds
beneath her face the inexorable face of death." 64 Yet through painful
steps and "world-shaking contests" mankind "has worked and fought
its way from savage isolation to organic social life." 65
64

Id. 27-28.
Id. 27. In a number of his private writings there is too willing a resignation to the
seeming inevitable facts of biological existence without waiting for further evidence. It
is the despairing note which is disengaging, but this must be understood as a protest
against the unrealism of rationalized existence which had done so poorly for mankind
to date. It is an attempt at an ultra-scientific explanation which has the merit that it
does not involve any conscious self-deception, although Holmes was often unconsciously
ambivalent. Under this heading are the assertions that we must think of "our existence
not as that of a little god outside, but as that of a ganglion within. • . ." "Essay on
Natural Law," id. at 3 I 6. He has little faith in reason and much in the argument of
force and prejudice. Letter to Mr. Wu, SHRIVER, HOLMES, BooK NoncEs,. UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 151, 173 (1936). While he spoke of prejudices he was
cognizant of "preliminary judgments based on a knowledge admitted not to be exhaustive
but which on the peril of one's soul one had to act as life is short." Id., 173. "Every
society," he stated, "is founded on the death of men." Id. 181 and 183. "Nature has but
one judgment on wrong conduct, ••• the judgment of death. If you waste too much
food, you starve; too much fuel, you freeze; too much nerve tissue, you collapse.•••
I nevertheless almost am prepared to say that every joy that gives to life its inspiration
consists in an excursion toward death, although wisely stopping short of its goal."
HoLMEs, CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 272 (1920). Yet he ambivalently said of the
labor of lawyers: "Our labor is an endless organic process. The organism whose being
is recorded and protected by the law is the undying body of society." Answer to Resolution
on Death of Daniel S. Richardson in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES 47
(1918). He was skeptical about "cosmic ultimates" in a very confidential letter: "This
is private talk, not to be quoted to others, for one is shy and sensitive as to one's inner
convictions.•••" Id. 185. Another letter ends ••• "0 Cosmos Now lettest thou thy
ganglion dissolve in peace." Id. 202. He spoke of having "had many black years" and
65
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4. "Sovereign Choice" as a Dissenting Mechanism
While Holmes was "slow to consent to overruling a precedent" he
saw that in the "conflict between two social desires" doubts would arise
and "where there is doubt the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and
even if it is disguised and unconscious, the judges are called on to
exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." 66 Here again we have
evidence of the everpresent ambivalence, the contrasting polar dynamisms-in this case precedent versus choice, or, otherwise expressed,
authority and dissent. In limiting choice to doubtful cases he was, as he
would say, drawing the line; but the fact is that he underestimated the
part which ambiguity plays even in seemingly unequivocal situations.
This need for some certainty ( if we may so label it) finds its most unpleasant expression in the feeling of utter unhappiness often attending any
attempt to destroy the illusion of its existence. His frequent references
to death as the penalty for not following precedent, that is, doing original
thinking indicates a strong pressure from within that is akin to the more
primitive phases of childhood and to that prevailing among primitive
men. "It is one of the virtues of culture," we are told by modern researchers in behavior, "that the goals of action and very often the behavior
sequences which lead to the goals are ready-made, so that in frustration
situations with children random behavior is less necessary in establishing
gratifying substitute responses than it is in other animals." 67 The tendency is for "substitute responses to be fixated and used on subsequent
occasions." 68 The "ready-made" goals as applied to law are the legal
precedents but the fixation of substitute responses deals with personal
behavior.
5. Di~tinction Between General and Personal Precedent

In other words, in our legal thinking we have failed to distinguish
between types of precedent. It is utterly wrong to assume that a precedent
which is either a goal or a fact-finding device will function according to
its character. Each individual has his own substitute precedents of conexpressed a need "to want something fiercely and want it all the time, sticking to the
rugged course." Id. 203. While he believed that "to live is to function. That is all there
is in living," (id. 142), he was constantly in fear that his mind would end in a cul-de-sac.
CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra this note, pp. 245-246 and SHRIVER, id. 173. He
lived to a greater degree than most persons in what seemed to be the solitude of thought.
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270.
66
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1920).
67
DOLLARD, FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION 58 (1939).
68
Id., IOI.
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duct which may draw on the ready-made ones for no other purpose than
personal gratification; or what is a simple but deep-seated compulsive
device 69 which satisfies the individual may be sought to be imposed by
projection as a valuable precede;nt for society. Accordingly, Holmes
could-as everyone at some time does-acquire some measure of relief
from his own personal conflict by an engrossment of his mind in the ideas
of continuity, tradition and history. It then would follow that the courts
must give effect to these ideas although in another breath Holmeslike most other people-would deny the very repression which is thus
accomplished. Nor could there be any doubt that these ideas properly
understood and applied have a realistic basis in the psychodynamic
processes. But we cannot overlook his repeated denials while our mind is
focused on his affirmations. Conformity is a personal precedent for him
notwithstanding at other times nonconformity is so strong a force that
it becomes the psychodynamic equivalent of death. Modern psychiatry
has by this time demonstrated by innumerable instances and overwhelming proof that the projection of one's self outwardly may have as its prime
purpose the transformation of the external world for therapeutic reasons,
as a healing process for the particular individual.70 The precedent which
is sought to be imposed on the whole of society and which is made to
seem as the answer to all social ills turns out often to be no more than a
personal cure, a sedative or perhaps an analgesic. And what is more
unfortunate is that there is no discrimination so that the ready-made
patterns which really have objective value as guides to action suffer the
same fate. The result is that the "prior art" is also adopted as personal
precedent and is expropriated to serve the needs of individual adventure.71 It would appear to us, then, that there is an enormous hiatus
69
As to precedent formation among children who have had emotional difficulties
see Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life II," 44
MICH. L. REv. 243 at 262 et seq. (1945).
70
See HENRY, EssENTIALS OF PSYCHIATRY 64 (1928).
71
An interesting example to illustrate how both types of precedent may combine for
a social purpose is found in a quotation from Tom Paine who said: "He that would
make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates
this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach himself." Quoted by Mr. Justice
Robert H. Jackson in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. l at 48, 65 S.Ct. 918 (1944).
Here Paine, who was a very aggressive person, lays down a rule for society but is also
giving expression to his own need for self-control.
The part of self-punishment or, more accurately, self-control, as a method of social
compliance has been given no attention in legal discussion. Excommunication is the
social instrument for dealing with non-conformists but this does not end the matter.
Bronislaw Malinowski tells that among the Tobrianders, when there has been a breach
of exogamy, if "scandal breaks out every one turns against the guilty pair and by
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between the psychodynamic aspects of precedent as an element of selfcontrol and the implementation of the precedent as an objective source
of information about conduct and the use of such information for the
purpose of social guidance. In primitive life it is the personal application
of social precedent in the various magical rituals which is confused and
merged with the attainment of objective social values. In other words,
self-control is the same as social control. While self-control is essential,
of course, it is in the confounding of the psychodynamic operation of
self-control mechanisms with social precedents that most of our individual and social distortions arise. It is in this field that the confusion between an individual's belief and social purpose becomes most incongruous
and causes most of the resistance to the advancement of the human mind
as an applied knowledge. It is more than merely good caution to supplement freedom of speech, of the press and of religion with a high degree
of capacity on the part of members in society so as to enable them to
function better and at the same time to make it possible for them to detect
the effort to project individual control mechanisms onto society. Indeed,
"Know thyself" must become an essential part of the training for law
and government.
We do not share the doubts of Judge Jerome Frank about the
possibility of greater objectivity on the part of judges. We are not
ready, surely, at this early stage of development of the human mind
as a self-scrutinizing mechanism to dismiss the problem of judicial bias
or any bias, for that matter, with rather discouraging misgivings and
dubiety. We would have expected the author of Law and the Modern
Mind to offer more than this: "But that is no complete solution. Perhaps
there is none; perhaps there is." 12 The work of extracting the semblance
of process from that perplexing jumble of human hit and miss which is
usually included under the term culture has barely begun. However,
such a view cannot be dismissed lightly when it comes from one who
gave to the science of jurisprudence some of its most objective perspectives as to the processes which give rise to legal formulations and who
single-handedly initiated a science of precedent-formation-a work
which has continued steadily in numerous publications. Such a view must
be considered as a challenge. But I shall not attempt an answer here.
ostracism and insults one or the other may be driven to suicide." CRIME AND CusTOM IN
SAVAGE SocIETY 80 ( I 926). He also states that as among primitives, where the motive •
for suicide "is complex, embracing the desire of self-punishment, revenge, rehabilitation,
and sentimental grievance" so among civilized men the traces of the existence of comparable mental attitudes exist. Id., 95.
12
In book review in 59 HARV. L. REv. 1004 at IOII (1946).
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6. Holmes and His Dissenting Father
No systematic comparison between Holmes the Justice and his father,
Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, has yet been made. It is one which should
be made because it will be found to be a fruitful source of the study of
some revealing facts of Holmes' psychodynamic history and render it
possible to trace these into legal thought. We venture only a few observations here-not as a digression-but for the direct bearing which they
will have upon the judicial process. First of all, both the father and son
were eminent and forceful dissenters. This was also true, it will be
recalled, in the case of Johnson and his father who was one of those who
started the "ball of revolution" rolling in South Carolina. But the father,
Dr. Holmes, enjoyed dissent, thrived on it and even-as is the case in
much scientific dissent-was able to capitalize on it. One finds in his
writings little fear of ostracism or death because of dissent but a contempt
for those who would threaten. Instead of causing him pain, dissent was
for him a source of psychic pleasure, which is as it should be if we are
not to have morbid scientists. His bulwark was the ability without fear
to evaluate the majority objectively and to be sure that he was strong
and the majority was weak-which it usually is. At the same time he
apparently did not hate the majority, a singularly remarkable trait in
one who was so scientifically critical of it, since he often combined jest
and humor and poetic plain-speaking with science. He was, evidently,
able to bask in the full effulgence of warm acceptance by many of those
whom he criticized. One might go as far. as to say that Dr. Holmes'
life is a sample with a few exceptions of an attainable and enviable
empathy in the relationship between the critic and society and indicates
that a much different level is possible than the one which generally
prevails. It has important implications for the study of the relationship
between the creative dissenter and society as a problem in communication.
Better than most persons he was able to combine a liking for people with
a dislike of their false ideas and sham procedures. This is most difficult
-for it is one of the commonest and most accepted practices to appear
to love humanity as an expiation for feelings of hatred.
While the Doctor was one of the pioneer students of the dynamics
of human motivation, the mind in action, the son-more sensitive and
fearful than his father-hoped that future men would explore that to
which he had merely called attention. He would rather apply whatever
insight he had than attempt to formulate it. And what a wide expanse of
difference in the polarity of their perspectives! Whereas the son thought
of a word "as the skin of a living thought" the father said that every
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word we speak "is the medal of a dead thought or feeling," struck in the
die of some human experience, worn smooth by innumerable contacts,
and always transferred warm from one to another. 78 Holmes, Sr., dissented with relish and with confidence; Holmes,Jr.,dissented with fear.
Holmes, the Justice, often yielded in despair to the majority but Dr.
Holmes, the psychologist, not only hoped for better things but reflected
on how to achieve them. "We wonder, therefore, when we find a soul
which was born to a full sense of individual liberty, an unchallenged
right of self-determination on every new alleged truth offered to its
intelligence, voluntarily surrendering any portion of its liberty to a
spiritual dictatorship which always proves to rest, in the last analysis,
on a majority vote, nothing more or less, commonly an old one, passed in
those barbarous times when men cursed and murdered· each other for
differences of opinion, and of course were not in a condition to settle the
beliefs of a comparatively civilized community.m4 While Justice Holmes
spoke rather generally of unconscious motivations, Dr. Holmes delved
scientifically in the "underground workshop" of thought. 75 And while
Justice Holmes seemed to give in with sadness to the force of prejudice
Dr. Holmes held it out in front of him to look at it with the careful and
analyzing eye of a scientist. "Old prejudices," he declared, "that are
ashamed to confess themselves, nudge our talking thought to utter their
magisterial veto." 76
78
From ELSIE VENNER c. 28 p. 514 (1887). He believed, however, that ideas
are intimately connected with growth in the ,sense that an idea "is an impression made
on a living tissue, which is the seat of active nutritive processes." MECHANISM IN
THOUGHT AND MoRALs 57 (1871). The implication of "growth" by reason of this
connection is possible as a figure of speech but, is also questionable, even though more
plausible.
Justice Holmes' ambivalence on the subject of language and formula is illustrated by
the following which should be contrasted with his emphasis on the living nature of
language. "To rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." Holmes,
"Ideals and Doubts," IO ILL. L. REv. I at 3 (1915). While he urges us to "think
things instead of words" he warns us that "you cannot give it definiteness of contour by
calling it a thing"-he was referring to a business which is made to seem like land by
calling it "property." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 at 342, 42 S.Ct. 124 (1921).
74
HoLMES, MECHANISM IN THOUGHT AND MoRALs 314-315. Also id., 500, where
he speaks of the "almighty Majority-Vote." (Italics supplied.)
75
MECHANISM IN THOUGHT AND MoRALS 38 (1871). This remarkable address
delivered to the Phi Beta Kappa Society in 1870 expressed ideas which were to become
the core of modern psychiatry.
See id., 41, for his discussion of dreams and sleep. This work is referred to in CLODD,
MYTHs AND DREAMS 183 (1871) and also in OBENDORF, THE PSYCHIATRIC NoVELS
OF OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, edited by Oberndorf, 7 (1943).
76
MECHANISM IN THOUGHT AND MoRALS 44 (1871).
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7. Johnson and Dissent to E~pand Knowledge
Johnson was nearer to the Dr. Holmes type of dissenter, although
there is some measure of the Justice Holmes fear evident but to a markedly lesser degree. While Johnson did not say that the majority was
presumptively wrong he questioned the authority of the average mind,
the "slow calculators." Both Johnson and Dr. Holmes dissented in order
to further knowledge and understanding. Each was interested in adding
his contribution to the progress of the mind in action. This must be done
lest the majority dominate not only our conduct but our thought. Justice
Holmes, on the other hand, dissented in order to let the majority do the
experimental work which he found himself unable to do for psychological
reasons. Johnson and Dr. Holmes were themselves creative dissenters;
whereas Holmes, the Justice, was content reluctantly to dissent for the
purpose of indirectly accomplishing what he did not choose to do himself,
because he was held back by what he himself called the "can't-helps."
8. Dissent as a Majority Phenomenon
The uneasiness which we have already found as an accompaniment
of dissent and which has not become channeled into an avoidance mechanism-may also be detected at times in the majority opinion where
comparable psychodynamic factors exist. Thus, the prevailing opinion
of the Court-with or without dissent-may contain an apologia for a
decision. The rational exposition in such cases does not adequately reveal
an unexpressed, though actually felt, motivation. Our appellate courts
are psychodynamically fearful bodies and this is, as we have already
suggested, because they are invested with an omnipotence which permits
them to live out earlier patterns of behavior. Most of our appellate
bodies confer and decide in secret session.
There is much truth in Holmes' statement "disguise it by veiling
words." 77 Usually there is a mixture of response to reality and unconscious motivation in the conventional declination to act on grounds of
policy and wisdom which is so often stated to be for the legislature or the
executive. When Johnson had to adjudge the rights of the Cherokee
Nation, which was a minority group seeking recognition of certain rights
which conquest had well nigh obliterated, he declared: "Courts of justice
are properly excluded from all considerations of policy. . . ." 78 The
psychodynamic problem here is not necessarily the same as the political
77

Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 at 211, 48 S.Ct. 480 ( 1928).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) I at 30 (1831). In Georgia v.
Sundry African Slaves, I Pet. ( 26 U.S.) 11 o at 12 5 ( 1828) he found it necessary to
vindicate judicial action.
78
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one. What Johnson said is still "good law." But we are left free to ask''What are some of the psychological factors which have motivated the
judges in their concessions of power to others"? Johnson put it largely on
the ground of unfitness in the wider sense. But that is not a sufficient
reason because it does not go far enough. Very often the unfitness is
declared after the judge has already unconsciously taken sides. The
declaration of unfitness is partly a realistic avoidance and partly an
unconscious avoidance due to identification, projection and other psychodynamic factors. It is not enough that the jurisprudence of the future
dispose of such questions as the conflict between the casuistical concept
of natural law and the pragmatic.79 If the disguises are unfortunate
nothing short of further scientific application will be of any help.

9. Judicial Hesitancy
We have seen that a judicial declaration as to delicacy of the question
may be an avoidance procedure. But this does not mean that the hesitancy
is not justified by the complexity of the facts presented. Deliberation is
a functional psychic means of avoidance of precipitate conflict which is
felt to be dangerous. If not carried to excess it is a valuable mechanism.
But this does not always follow. For example, in his separate opinion
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Mr. Justice Story declared that it had not for one moment escaped him "how delicate, difficult,
and ungracious" was the task devolved upon the Court. 80 Yet he concluded that the Court had nothing to do but "pronounce the law as we
find it...." The contrasting nature of these statements shows that the
conflict was not resolved.
Johnson in his opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, a bold and creative
opinion, wrote: "I enter with great hesitation upon this question, because
it involves a subject of the greatest delicacy and much difficulty." 81 And
in Gibbons v. 0 gden, where federal control over commerce was involved,
he approached the question as one of "great importance and great delicacy." 82 "It is with extreme hesitation," he declares in The Rapid, "and
79
Live Poultry Dealers' Assn. v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1924) 4 F. (2d) 840
at 842, where Judge Learned Hand said: "It is impossible to draw a line which shall be
immune from casuistical attack, and perhaps it is unfortunate that the somewhat arbitrary and pragmatic nature of what courts do in such cases has been so frequently disguised
by a show of deduction."
80
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 at 712 (1819).
81
6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 at 145 (1810).
82
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I at 223 (1824). The quoted words are from the following
context: "The judgment entered by the court in this cause has my entire approbation; but
having adopted my conclusions on views of the subject materially different from those
of my brethren, I feel it incumbent upon me to exhibit those views. I have also another
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under a deep sense of the delicacy of the duty which we are called upon to
discharge that we proceed to adjudge the forfeiture of private right, upon
principles of public law highly penal in their nature, and unfortunately,
too little understood.',. 88 Likewise, in The Nereide: "Circumstances,
known to this Court, have imposed upon me, in a great measure, the
responsibility of this decision. I approach the case with all the hesitation
which respect for the opinion of others, and a conviction of the novelty
and importance some of the questions are calculated to inspire. The
same respect imposes upon me an obligation briefly to state the course of
reasoning by which I am led to my conclusion." 8 "' Here again is the
everpresent ambivalence, novelty versus the opinion of others, which
produces "hesitation."
But after we have observed these evidences of hesitation and some
fear we must stjll reach the conclusion that Johnson more than any other
jurist disagreed for functional purpose. He felt an emerging awareness,
imparted by the new sciences which were appearing on man's cultural
horizon, which saw uncertainties and ambiguities in human relationships,
which had to be faced, where others saw only tabus and general principles.
Sometimes the task was simple. "The principles of law involved in this
cause are few and simple, and well established; and all the difficulties
consist in so arranging the facts as to apply the principles correctly...."
expresses the most basic of all legal methods.85 In his opening remarks in
Campbell's Executors v. Pratt, however, complexity was seen and acknowledged: "This cause has its origin in the.great case of Pratt, Francis,
et al., which appeared in this court some years ago with the formidable
bulk of nine hundred folios! The rights of the parties had become exceedingly perplexed in the progress of large and multifarious transactions,
originating in the speculations of Morris, Nicholson & Greenleaf, in the
land of this city." 86 The task of sorting facts upon which to apply principles is but a phase of the interrelation of reality to the processes of the
intellect. ·
Because language is our prime intellectual instrument of communication Johnson studied its uses and limitations, its employment in the
protection of human rights and also its other side-that of creating the
inducement: In questions of great importance and great delicacy, I feel my duty to
the public best discharged by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way."
88
8 Cranch (12 U.S.) 155 at 160 (1814). (Italics supplied.)
8
"' 9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 388 at431 (1815). (Italics supplied.)
85
Jackson v. Huntington, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 402 at 430 (1831).
86
2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 354 at 355 (1829).
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means of doubt and confusion. He was the arch enemy of unnecessary
ambiguities which might have been avoided. "My object in expressing
my opinion in this case," wrote Johnson, "is to avoid having an ambiguous
decision imputed to me, or an opinion which I would not wish to be
understood to have given." 87 Dissent means to be able to differentiate
even when in agreement as to what should be done in a particular case;
and conversely, differentiation implies frequent disagreement. The fact
of concurrence in result does foreclose the expression of different insight,
as in Hudson v. Guestier: "I concur in the reversal of the decision of
the court below, but on different grounds from those which influence the
opinion of my brethren." 88 The avoidance of ambiguity in the entirety
is a large and impossible commitment. Anyone who undertakes it is
suspect of indulging in an avoidance procedure for resolution of personal
conflict, the application of personal precedent to social problems. Such
persons are the "perfectionists" of common,parlance. Nevertheless, the
conscious effort to understand how the mind is enticed by seeming clarity
as distinguished by adult functional rationality is what really distinguishes mature thought from superstition.

ro. Dissent to "Keep the Door Open"
At the early period of our history when everything was more
obviously in the trial and error stage Johnson was not ready to close
the door. This was especially true in constitutional cases whether he
concurred or dissented. "Entertaining different views on the questions in
this cause from the majority of the court," he asserted in dissentions in
Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 89 "and wishing generally that
my reasons for my opinion on constitutional questions should appear,
where they cannot be misunderstood or misrepresented, I will briefly
state the ground upon which I dissent from the decision now rendered."
As we have seen, he knew only too well for the composure of some how
the opinions of others were misapplied. He had no intention to preserve
confusion. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,9° where he concurred, he gave
the same reason: "In pursuance of my practice, in giving an opinion on all
constitutional questions, I must present my views on this."
His differentiating mind reveals an awareness of its own objectives
87

Marine Insurance Co. v~ Young, 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 187 at 191 (1809).
4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 293 at 298 (1808).
89
2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 449 at 470 (1829). A century later the dissent in this case was
adopted in substance in Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 59 S.Ct. 595 (1939).
90
5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 1 at 20 (1831).
88
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in what he said in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee: "In this view I acquiesce in
their opinion, but not altogether in the reasoning, or opinion, of my
brother who delivered it. Few minds are accustomed to the same habit of
thinking, and our conclusions are most satisfactory to ourselves when
arrived at in our own way."°~
"Whoever will candidly weigh the intrinsic difficulties which this
case presents," declared Johnson in Green v. Biddle, "must acknowledge
that the questions certified to this court are among those on which any
two minds may differ, without incurring the imputation of wilful or
precipitate error." 92 Some who delight in depreciation might be too
ready to find an uncanny similarity suggesting imitation in the language
of Justice Holmes in Bartels v. Iowa: "I think I appreciate the objection
to the law but it appears to me to present a question upon which men
might reasonably differ and, therefore, I am unable to say that the
Constitution of the United States prevents the experiment being tried." 93
But what is often deemed uncanny is nothing more than due to the
obscured vision which has shut out the likenesses which appear to have
presented themselves to those with keener insight. The two statements
represent similar psychodynamic processes directed to the most difficult
of all human functions-the detached judgment.
I I.

The Gilchrist Case

"Wilful and precipitate" dissent is not creative dissent. It does not
allow for the time needed to judge properly all the elements of a conflict
situation because the one who judges is judging-if that term may be
used-an entirely different conflict, namely, his own. Here we must not
confuse with aggressive arbitrariness the application to the situation of
what we call strength of character and personal courage without which
many a new thought would never have seen the light. Even if it should
appear to some that Johnson at times seemed to carry independence too
far such judgment would have to be appraised against the difficulties
91
1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 at 362 (1816). On the subject of Johnson's seriatim
opinions see Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 M1cH. L.
REv. 497 at 512 et seq. (1944). See also preliminary remarks in Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 at 222 (1824); Durronseau v. United States, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.)
307 at 323 (1810); Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 99 at 135 (1830);
Ramsay v. Allegre, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 6u at 614 (1827); Satterlee v. Mathewson,
2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 378 at 415 (1829); Huidekoper v. Douglas, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.)
lat 72 (1805).
92
8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 1 at 94 (1823). (Italics supplied.)
93
262 U.S. 404 at 412, 43 S.Ct. 628 (1912). (Italics supplied.)
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which confronted him from the very beginning. Ex parte Gilchrist 94
decided by Johnson is a good example of personal exGitation which would
have tried the strongest mind. The case was decided on circuit in opposition to Jefferson's Embargo Act. C. A. Rodney, the Attorney General
of the United States, had published an opinion criticizing Johnson's
decision. Jefferson, who had appointed Johnson, had expressed concern
about the decision "because of the quarter from whence came" such
resistance.95 Here was a human problem presenting a conflict between
loyalty and one's own individuality as directed to performance of official
duty. Johnson, thinking that Jefferson had instigated Rodney's opinion,
published a reply ~hat tells quite a little about Johnson's motivation in
the decision. It is singularly consistent with what we have already learned
about his approach to problems. Johnson did not object to criticism, he
replied, since he believed "an opinion that cannot withstand a free and
candid investigation must be erroneous." But he declined to be silent
when this meant "being borne down by the weight of reasoning or awed
by power." This is interesting as indicating that both reasoning and
power could act inordinately. But the real key to the decision seems to be
found in his comment on the plight of the Collector of Charleston: that
"he may also have felt that sentiment of injury which affects the mind
of everyone upon the undue restriction of the exercise of his own faculties."00 In other words, Johnson had yielded on the side of liberty. This
feeling had always been strong with him. His identification with the
Collector in that situation was a confessed identification in favor of a
human symbol of liberty and the consequent rejection of the restraint
imposed by the Executive Order. Such identifications are a common
occurrence in the judicial process and, indeed, in all human experience,07
though not always so deeply felt and candidly acknowledged.
9

,110 Fed. Cas. 355, No. 5420 (1808).
See 2 ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DuRING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 263 (1890).
96
Rodney's Letter and Johnson's Reply will be found appended to the Report of
the case in IO Fed. Cas. No. 5420 p. 355.
97
Identification with a losing party or one whose character has been impunged is
frequently the basis for an attempted solace of words. Judges fear attacks on character
because they are emotionally involved. In Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 421
(1823), Justice Johnson said that the whole matter had been put together to admit of
"distorted views" by reason of mixing up of the interests of trustee and cestui and went
on to say: "It is, however, some satisfaction to me to be able to vindicate their (the
defendants') innocence while I feel myself compelled to subject them to a serious loss."
. Id. at 463. See likewise The Venus, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 127 (1820), where he expressed
95
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Johnson was quite ready to admit that he may have erred. "It is
enough, however, and all that a Judge, who has understanding enough
to be conscious of his own fallibility, can pretend to, that there existed
grounds at least specious for the issuing of the mandamus. . . . There
never existed a stronger case for calling forth the power of a court; and
whatever censure the executive sanction may dra_w upon us, nothing can
deprive us of the consciousness of having acted with firmness, impartiality
and an honest intention to discharge our duty." 98 Eventually Johnson
confessed error with some qualifying remarks. 99 However, there was
no error in his method notwithstanding his own frank admission. The
memory of Marbury v. Madison 100 was still quite fresh in his mind. He
had entertained some doubts as to the effect that should be given to the
decision as a restriction on nisi prius judicial action.101 Here was a clear
case where Johnson did not consider it a "misfortune" to dissent even
though he later followed the precedent of a different rule of law.
I 2.

Outspoken Dissent

In Page v. Patton 1° , his dissent was plain-spoken and without ap2

parent regret. "As I understand the decision just delivered, it affirms a
principle to which I certainly cannot yield my assent." Yet this is rather
restrained when compared to the opening language in Ramsay v. Allegre103 where he declared that "it was high time" to check this silent and
stealing progress of the admiralty, in acquiring jurisdiction to which it
has no pretentions. "Unfounded doctrines ought at once to be met and
put down...." In Columbian Insurance Co. v. Catlett 104 there was no
shrinking judicial courtesy exhibited toward his brethren: "I concur with
satisfaction in having enabled an honest man to save his property and "vindicate his
reputation." Id. at 131. See also note on Tom Paine, note 73, supra.
98
Id. at 131. (Italics supplied.)
99
M'Intyre v. Wood, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 504 (1813). In the concluding words
of the opinion Johnson said: "A. case occurred some years since in the Circuit Court
of South Carolina, the notoriety of which may apologize for making an observation upon
it here. It was a mandamus to a collector to grant a clearance, and unquestionably could
not have been issued but upon a supposition inconsistent with the decision in this case.
But that mandamu~ was issued upon the voluntary submission of the collector and the
district attorney, and in order to extricate themselves from an embarrassment resulting from conflicting duties. Volenti non fit injuria." Id. at 506.
100
1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
101
Dissent in Ex Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 75 (1807).
102
5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 304 at 317 (1831).
103
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 611 at.614 (1827).
104
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 383 at 397 (1827).
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the court in all the points decided in this cause, except that which relates
to freight. On that, it is my impression, that they have misapprehended
the case, the question and the doctrine on which it turns. If so, it is not
to be wondered at, if it should appear that they have decided upon the
authority of adjudications which have no bearing upon the case." In
Patterson v. Winn, 105 however, there is a mixture of firm criticism and
some regret. Though he concurred with the decision he would not accept
the opinion of Mr. Justice Story: "I am very well content that the
judgment in this court should be reversed, as it went off below, on
grounds which had little to do with the merits of the case. But I regret
that no other grounds have been found for reversal than such as I feel it
my duty to enter my protest against." But the regret here expressed is
rather a criticism-the regret that the other judges had not quite understood or been able to. Nevertheless, while he was essentially a man of
candor and direct statement, he was also not slow to recognize it in others.
"This cause has been discussed very much at large," he wrote in DeWolf
v. Johnson, "and with a degree of talent, candor, and research, very
satisfactory to the court." 108

II
THE JUDGING FACULTY

A. Maturity of the Judging Faculty
Johnson with all of his fortitude was neither impetuous nor bellicose.
The task was new, the work was difficult, the understanding little. Yet
he was not quixotic. He did not create windmills in his own imagination
in order to tilt against them, although he did battle against the phantoms
of others. Carson has said that his "legal instincts outran his powers of
expression."1°1 If by "legal instincts" Carson means to include that range
of cognition which is fed from the streams of unconscious thought1° 8 then
105
106

5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 233 at 243 (1831).
IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) 367 at 377 (1825).

101
CARSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME CouRT 228 (1892). See for earlier comment, Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REV.
497 at 527 (1944).
108
These words are put in quotes because the subject matter as to motivation is in
controversy at some points. But there is no controversy on the general division into
conscious and unconscious factors although even in this regard there are some limitations
due to the inevitable necessity of verbalizing findings. Some few individuals have been
able to give effect to a psychodynamic awareness or cognitiveness which in the average
person would be considered a part of his unconscious. This is certainly true of Shakespeare
who knew much about human motivation which has only recently been discovered by
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it is a fair estimate-except for the inference that his power of expression
was inadequate.
It is this meaning of "instinct" which Holmes must have had in mind
in one of his cases when he sat as Chief Justice of the ·supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. In commenting on a group of cases cited as
precedents he observed that "perhaps the reasoning of the cases had not
always been as sound as the instinct which directed the decision." 100 It is
this "instinct" which is the psychodynamic source of the "judgment or
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise"-that now
famous phrase which appeared in his dis:;;ent in Lochner v. New Y ork.110
And, paradoxically, it is this also which Holmes meant when he spoke
of the accident of "immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment." 111 In any case we are sure that
Holmes was aware of the fragmentary nature of conscious knowledge and
that the foundation of judgment may be "inarticulate and unconscious."
Holmes once wrote of a creed that he believed to be "the creed of
ignorance and immaturity when honestly held...." 112 In this respect
he was in perfect accord with his father who longed for the soul with
"self-determination" who would not "voluntarily" surrender liberty
to ignorance. Concessions will always have to be made, of course, to keep
the peace in any group where diverse attitudes prevail. But such compromises must be made reluctantly in order to prevent the mind and the
constituents of the group from remaining fixed at the mental level of
a majority vote. The present relish for history and similar "seductive
cliches" is the simplest avoidance of the difficult effort-and fearinvolved in the hardest of all psychodynamic processes, that is, differentiation, and living and acting in accordance with it. It would be, indeed,
the equivalent of self-immolation if the jurist would consider his function
to be to keep the peace of society irrespective of the advances which have
been made in the knowledge of the factors which enter into the very
activity of judging. No mature jurist could wish to act in such an office.
psychiatry as part of the unconscious. Much of what Shakespeare "knew," even though
not entirely articulate, has now been scientifically classified. The significance of the
existence of a Shakespeare is that a broadening of the range of knowledge of human
motivation is possible.
109
Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472 at 476 (1901).
110
198 U.S. 45 at 74, 25 S.Ct. 539 (1905).
111
Dissent in Northern S~curities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 at 400, 24
S.Ct. 436 (1903).
112
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 629, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919).
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History is largely the record of immaturity alleviated only yesterday
by the protection of the rights of free speech, the right of belief, the right
of locomotion-and all the others in the Bill of Rights which seem to
be in imminent danger of being lost. The jurist who would reflect only
the customs of the dominant groups irrespective of the gains made in the
sciences of behavior could hardly meet the qualifications of mature
judging which have been stated as: "The ability to size things up, make
one's own decision. . . . Basically, maturity represents a wholesome
amalgamation of two things: r--dissatisfaction with the status quo,
which calls forth aggressive, constructive effort, and 2--social concern
and devotion. It is morale in the individual." 113

B. Johnson as a Mature Jurist
By these tests Johnson was a mature jurist. Our study of his life and
writings has shown a consistent and even stubborn purpose to depart
from the conventions of "make-believe." He seemed to sense, with a
mind looking way into the future, that creative differentiation could not
be avoided if the law was to function in a world of diverse peoples and
viewpoints. While Holmes spoke of "delusive exactness" he was cautious
and kept aloof from a turbulent world. Johnson actually went into the
fray to battle against those who would palm off such delusions as real.
We do not have enough material to judge accurately but it does seem
that with such objectives Johnson's occasional impetuosity must be placed
against a social environment of a less competent nature as ample cause
for provocation. We see no evidence of immaturity in his courageous
effort to advance the level of the mind from superstition to knowledge.

C. Johnson's Knowledge of the Part Played by Immature Factors
That Johnson had the insight to be aware of the influence of childhood on the maturity or immaturity of later judgments accounts for
the unusual penetration of his thinking and the self-confidence which
113

Quotation is by Major General C. B. Chisholm from Strecker and Appel in that
extraordinary and courageous series of lectures entitled "The Psychiatry of Enduring
Peace." General Chisholm, who is Deputy Minister of Health Department of National
Health and Welfare, Canada, delivered these as The William Alanson White Memorial
Lectures. The quotation is from page 7 of the pamphlet which was printed in 1946. See
also 9 PsYCHIATRY, February l 946.
Subsequently, Dr. Edward A. Strecker dwelt further on the subject of maturity
in his severe censure of home training, ''What's Wrong With American Mothers?" 219
THE SATURDAY EVENING PosT (No. 17) 14 especially 93, 95 et seq. (October 26,
1946).
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comes from increased self-knowledge. In his comments on the early life
of Greene we find a number of observations which prove to us that his
psychological attitudes were not casual. He tells of the vague expectation
which prevailed in Greene's family and neighborhopd that he was one
day to become a prominent personage. But he promptly relegates this
prognostication to the effect of superstition and the popular belief in
omens. Not satisfied with the statement of a mere conclusion, he proceeds
to analyze a number of such prophecies and points to the fact that where
such tales of prognostics "had reached the ears of their imputed object,
they had, not infrequently, some efft!ct in giving a direction to his views,
and a stimulus to his exertions." 114 This is sound psychodynamics. But
if this be deemed a chance remark, we turn to his assertion that-"Such
is the ascendancy of the mind; and fortunate it is for society, when a
judicious direction is given to the early efforts of aspiring genius." 115
And we learn too that he was aware "how deep and durable are the
impressions of nursery tales even upon the strongest minds.mis The
effect of these early mental influences was also noticed in the conscious
training of their children by the North American Indians for careers of
hostility to their neighbors. Their "national animosities," he wrote, "are
faithfully transmitted through their women, and are among the first
lessons inculcated on the infant mind."117 This is, indeed, a lesson for
modern society!

D. Dissent as the Vehicle of the "Conservative''
It is illustrative of the ambivalence of the judicial mind in action
that it was in a dissenting opinion that Mr. Justice_ Roberts recently
complained of the "evil resulting from over-ruling earlier considered
decisions" and the unsettled state of affairs which would follow and the
"deplorable consequence" of the ,radministration of justice" falling
"into disrepute." 118 Such anxiety, however, reflects only the political
114
l WILLIAM JOHNSON, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
NATHANAEL GREENE 8.
115
Id., 9. (Italics supplied.)
116
Id.; 100. (Italics supplied.)
117
Id., Appendix c., p. 514. See also Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative
Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REv. 497 at 539 (1944).
118
Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 at IIZ, 64 S.Ct. 455 (1943).
In April, I 845, Mr. Justice Story, after many years of service on the Supreme Court,
,found himself alone and a dissenter. He bemoaned the fact that "new men and new
opinions" had succeeded the "Old Court." These new opinions were in the majority now.
Hence, he felt that "the vital doctrines" of the Constitution were no longer in the
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aspect of dissent. Legal society has not been sufficiently successful in
administering the affairs of the world to warrant the belief that the time
has come to call a halt to the mental processes of differentiation. Dissent
is the vehicle of the "conservative" as well as the "liberal"-words
which describe the conscious alternatives of an unconscious ambivalence
rather than fixed patterns of partisanship. After the advent of the "New
Deal" justices the dissenting role was the vehicle of protest of the
so-called "conservative" justices, Roberts, VanDevanter, Sutherland
and others. Whatever one may believe politically there has never yet
appeared a completely conservative or completely liberal justice. Indeed, one of the strangest phenomena of judicial conduct-though
psychodynamically explainable-has been the policy of non-restraint
in patent matters alongside almost complete avoidance in other fields of
judicial activity. The inescapable conclusion is that with very few exceptions writers in the field of jurisprudence have told us little of value
about the judicial process. It all points to one deduction and that is that
there is no place for what is called conservatism in the study of the functions of the mind in relation to legal processes and results and the need
for constant review of tentative findings from time to time.
Another glance at Justice Holmes demonstrates how little the individual knows about his own trend of thought. What Dr. Oliver Holmes
said about Byles Gridley, the tutor, in The Guardian Angel may be
said of the characteristic ambivalence of his son the Justice, who also
displayed "the strange union of trampling radicalism in some directions
and high-stepping conservatism in others .••." 119 So we find one of
Holmes' admirers attempting to explain away the popular impression
that Justice Holmes was a radical asserting that this is not the case "that
he is a firm believer in the regime of private property and the traditional
economics." 120 The words "radicalism" and "conservatism" are typically
ascendancy. "I am the last member now living of the old Court and I cannot consent to
remain, where I can no longer hope to see those doctrines recognized and enforced. For
the future, I must be in a dead minority of the Court, with the painful alternative of
either expressing an open dissent from the opinions of the Court, or, by silence, seeming
to acquiesce in them." Letter to Ezekiel Bacon, April, 1845, quoted by STEINER, LIFE
OF RoGER BROOKE TANEY 229 (1922). This was Story's second complaint about being
alone. In 1837, after Taney's appointment as Chief Justice, he had written that he
was "the last of the old race of judges. I stand their solitary representative with a pained
heart and subdued confidence." He thought of resigning but remained on. Id., 189.
119
THE PSYCHIATRIC NovELS OF OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, edited by Oberndorf,
133 (1943).
12
CoHEN, LAw AND THE SocIAL ORDER 367 (1933).
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ambivalent terminology and psychodynamically must be related to the
complexities of personality and society. But to the extent that "radicalism" implies a strong feeling of opposition to the average psychological
pressures of'society Holmes was unquestionably an outstanding radical.
No explanation can erase the reality of this estimate.

E. The Function of Dissent in Hastening Conscious Progress
To the politician the dissenter is a "disturber"-as often he is-but
to the scientist dissent, based upon the advancement of the knowledge
of psychodynamic processes, is inevitable. For the scientist knows, as
did Tylor in the latter part of the last century, that ... "mankind is
passing from the age of unconscious to the age of conscious progress,ni21
perhaps more rapidly than we imagine.

III
CONCLUSION

When we look at what Johnson was trying to bring into being it is no
exaggeration to say that judicial jurisprudence has lost a century. He was
himself, perhaps, too easily led to believe that "the motives that govern
the hearts of men, are soon discovered by the discerning, through the veil
too commonly thrown over human actions; often before the individual
is himself conscious of their full effect in influencing his conduct.ni22
Very little discernment was achieved during that century and little desire
to discern can be noticed. Such essays as have been written on the judicial
process with some few exceptions abound in the usual references to
the importance of unconscious factors and end there. That is also true
of judicial opinions which admonish us to attend to such factors but
avoid them with all of the assurance which comes from the indifference of omnipotence. Even Holmes' reluctant probing beneath the
surface-just below but no more-gave rise to much debate as to
whether dissents should not be suppressed. His followers came to the
defense but the reasons advanced did not proceed beyond those
already given by Justice Johnson a century earlier. Dissents were to
be allowed because the public has the right to know, because it has
121
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been the uniform practice, because able dissent accentuates decision, and
because stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Nowhere do we
find any claim for the need and right of dissent as an essential of democratic government in which the judiciary is the supreme arbiter over all
actions. Nor do we find in the utterances and writings of Holmes and his
followers any suggestion that dissent is a creative instrument which
Johnson saw as a means for accomplishing man's self-betterment by
further understanding and implementing the "expansive powers of the
human mind." Is dissent to be only the means of accentuating judicial
opinion--of merely dealing with matters within the self-selected range
of judicial choice rather than of pointing to wider ranges of judicial
competence? Should anyone doubt the need for a revised perspective
we refer him to the statement made but a few years ago that "there is no
social group in existence in which such freedom [ that is, to form a rational
opinion] exists."123
How long can the law like the camel live on its own hump of precedent judicially interpreted by methods which have been found inadequate
from the very beginning of man's history? We need only to look about us
to discover the fact that man lives under an illusion of well-being which
is· externally conditioned. By a wish strong enough to submerge all
else we have been led to believe that a faith in similarity and uniformity
without anything further will solve all of life's perplexities. This faith
was vigorously challenged by Johnson. The advent of Holmes did not
introduce a new jurisprudence. In some respects, as we have shown,
Johnson had greater insight than Holmes. It is quite correct to say that
the range of inquiry has progressed over what was admissible in the
period immediately preceding the advent of Holmes. But Johnson had
already shown a better way than resort to judicial reason by referring
to the context of events, the common incidents of life. We now have
compartmental approaches such as that of "politics," "economics," "sociology" and several others-all of which are related to the artificial notion
of police power or general power. To borrow Holland's phrase so aptly
quoted by Holmes we have "a chaos with a full index." 124
This concludes this series of studies of Justice William Johnson and
constitutional jurisprudence in which emphasis has been placed on the
individual psychodynamic sources of law. It was made possible because
123 BoAS, ANTHROPOLOGY AND MoDERN LIFE
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of Johnson's own awareness of the distortions in which he found himself
and his readiness to set down his reflections in his writings. He knew that
judging processes were impaired when "a strong, deep-seated feeling nurtured from earliest infancy, decides with instinctive promptness ...." 125 While lawyers, judges and politicians, in the accustomed
manner of controversial combat, debate the place which should be allotted
to modern psychodynamic researfhes, it is appropriate to close with an
observation which Johnson made over a century ago but which is 'today
the very foundation of all studies of the mind in action: "Less reality
often furnishes groundwork for more fiction."1 25
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